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Hard Times for Unions: Another Look at
the Significance of Employer Illegalities
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It is well known that the percentage of American workers in
the private sector belonging to labor unions ("union density") has
declined sharply in the last four decades.1 From 1953 to 1989, den-
sity fell from 35 percent to 12 percent,2 and the absolute number
of union members in the private sector shrank from more than 14.8
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' Union density refers to the percentage of employees in the labor force who belong to
unions. Plainly, union density in a particular industry must be distinguished from the
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creases because of an overall increase in employment. Thus, between 1953 and 1973 the
number of private sector union members increased by more than one million, but union
density declined by nine percentage points. See Leo Troy, The Rise and Fall of American
Trade Unions: The Labor Movement from FDR to RR, in Seymour M. Lipset, ed, Unions in
Transition 75, 82, Table 3 (ICS, 1986).
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million in 1953 to 10.5 million in 1989.1 Such declines have, of
course, occurred throughout our history.4 As Selig Perlman ob-
served in 1928, "[the overshadowing problem of the American la-
bor movement [has been] the problem of staying organized." 5
The recent decline is, however, distinctive because it occurred
within the ostensibly protective legal environment created by the
National Labor Relations Act of 1935 (the Wagner Act), as
amended.' An extensive literature has sought to identify and rank
the causes of this decline. Much of this literature attributes it prin-
cipally to social and economic developments that are largely be-
yond the short-term control of particular unions or firms.7
In a celebrated article, Professor Paul Weiler recognized that
these larger forces have shaped individual workers' decisions about
unionization." Nonetheless, he identified increased employer oppo-
sition and, especially, unlawful opposition, together with anemic
and dilatory statutory remedies, as major factors in the decline of
private sector unionism. We will call this emphasis the "rogue em-
ployer thesis." Specifically, Professor Weiler pointed to an increase
in two types of employer violations: discharges of union supporters
during organizational campaigns,' and employers' refusal to bar-
3 Troy and Sheflin, U.S. Union Sourcebook 3-14, Table 3.62 (cited in note 1); see Sta-
tistical Appendix, Section I.
' For example, the membership of American and Canadian unions declined from 5 mil-
lion in 1920 to 3.4 million in 1929. See Leo Wolman, Ebb and Flow in Trade Unionism 16,
Table 5 (National Bureau of Economic Research, 1936); Irving Bernstein, A History of the
American Worker-1920-1933: The Lean Years 203 (Penguin, 1960); Leo Wolman, The
Growth of American Trade Unions, 1880-1923 31-32 (National Bureau of Economic Re-
search, 1924).
Selig Pernman, A Theory of the Labor Movement 162 (Augustus M. Kelley, 1949).
' 29 USC §§ 151-169 (1988). For a summary of various provisions of the Act as
amended, see text at notes 16, 40-44, 63, 66, 73, 83, 91, 96, 109, 110.
7 See Bernard D. Meltzer, Is the NLRB a Closed Shop to Labor?, Wall St J 34 (Oct 18,
1984); Henry S. Farber, The Recent Decline of Unionization in the United States, 238
Science 915, 916-18 (1987); Troy, The Rise and Fall of American Trade Unions, in Lipset,
ed, Unions in Transition at 94-103 (cited in note 1); Seymour M. Lipset, North American
Labor Movements: A Comparative Perspective, in id, 442, 445-47, 459 (stressing the signifi-
cance of shifts in attitudes from class-conscious, anti-corporate, statist values to traditional,
individualistic, and free-market values). For further development of that thesis, see Sey-
mour M. Lipset, Labor and Socialism in Canada and the United States, Larry Sefton Me-
morial Lecture, University of Toronto, Wordsworth College (Mar 8, 1990). Farber, however,
highlights increased employer resistance, as measured by increased unfair labor practice
charges per election, and suggests that increased employer resistance, legal and illegal, has
resulted signficantly from foreign competition. Science at 919-20.
8 Paul Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing Workers' Rights to Self-Organization under
the NLRA, 96 Harv L Rev 1769, 1772-73 (1983).
See, for example, id at 1772-74, 1781.
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gain in good faith with newly certified unions.10 Indeed, he esti-
mated that one in twenty pro-union voters in elections conducted
by the National Labor Relations Board had been discriminatorily
discharged.1" Relying on these findings, he proposed significant
changes in the timing of NLRB representation elections," in the
remedies for "egregious" failures to bargain in good faith with a
newly certified union,"3 and in the type of economic pressures per-
mitted to employers and unions faced with a bargaining impasse.14
Others have already questioned whether employer illegalities
have been a major factor in the decline of American unions.' 5 We
explore that question in light of both legal and empirical consider-
ations that have frequently been neglected. The legal considera-
tions include the following: the extent to which the NLRA pro-
vides the basis for large backpay awards and reinstatement offers
in situations far removed from the organizational context, the doc-
trinal and legislative changes that have created new grounds or
new incentives for filing unfair labor practice charges against em-
ployers, and the expansion of the NLRB's jurisdiction by changes
in Board rules and by legislation.
The empirical considerations flow from our examination of
Board decisions in 1955 and 1980 and case-handling by the Chi-
cago regional office in 1985 and 1986. Through these and related
inquiries, we hope to cast some light on the incidence of employer
illegalities, particularly unlawful discharges during organizational
campaigns or first-contract negotiations, as distinguished from ille-
galities that occur during later stages of an employment relation-
'o Paul Weiler, Striking a New Balance: Freedom of Contract and the Prospects for
Union Representation, 98 Harv L Rev 351, 354-56 (1984). He has also referred to weakness
in the administration of the NLRA. Id at 360-61.
'i Weiler, 96 Harv L Rev at 1781 (cited in note 8).
1 In order to limit an employer's opportunity for pre-election coercion, Weiler pro-
posed "instant elections" to take place a few days after a union filed an election petition. Id
at 1812-16 (cited in note 8).
'3 In order to remedy such failure, an arbitrator would write the parties' agreement.
Weiler, 98 Harv L Rev at 405 (cited in note 10).
" In order to increase union bargaining leverage and legal protection, employers would
be barred from permanently replacing strikers, id at 387-94, and some of the prohibitions
against secondary boycotts by unions would be lifted, id at 415-19. Weiler, in Governing the
Workplace: The Future of Labor and Employment Law (Harvard, 1990), which reached us
long after we had submitted this article to the Law Review, repeats, reshapes, and supple-
ments various policy proposals set forth in his articles cited here. See notes 8, 10. The mer-
its of those proposals are beyond the scope of this Article. Our primary purposes are to
assess empirical findings that bear on the formulation and appraisal of such proposals and
to suggest changes in the Board's reporting of data about its operations that, in the longer
term at least, may facilitate more informed policy formulation.
15 See sources cited in note 7.
1991]
The University of Chicago Law Review
ship. Our empirical findings suggest that estimates of both the
losses of employment linked to organizational campaigns and the
frequency with which employers violate their duty to bargain in
relation to newly certified unions have been too high."6
We proceed as follows. Part I describes the factors in the de-
cline in union density, particularly the potential role of employer
illegalities. Part II briefly treats legislative and doctrinal changes
that have enlarged the Board's effective jurisdiction, created new
grounds for substantial backpay awards, and provided organiza-
tional benefits to unions from filing charges (including unmeritori-
ous ones) against employers alleging violations of the Act. Part III
presents the results of our study of decisions by the Board and
settlements by its Chicago regional office. Part IV reassesses the
contention that employer misconduct has been a major factor in
union decline. Finally, Part V suggests ways in which the NLRB
could change its rubrics for describing its docket-changes that
would probably make the data contained in the Board's annual re-
ports more useful to students of industrial relations, and especially
to those seeking to understand the connections among various
kinds of employer unfair labor practices and the organizational
failures of unions.
I. THE DECLINE IN PRIVATE SECTOR UNIONIZATION
A. The Effects of Changes in Employment Composition
Economic and cultural factors independent of employer ille-
galities explain much of American deunionization since the 1950s.
Some goods-producing industries-the traditional strongholds of
the union movement-have suffered substantial declines in em-
ployment. The steel and automobile industries are striking illustra-
tions. The goods-producing industries as a whole have also suffered
a decline in employment relative to that of the services industries,
which traditionally have been less unionized.17 Several interrelated
factors have contributed to these structural changes, including a
16 Other employer violations during organizational campaigns, such as coercive speech
or unlawful benefits, may also frustrate union organizational efforts. Our principal concern
here is, however, with discriminatory discharges during organizational campaigns and with
employer refusals to recognize, or to bargain in good faith with, a newly certified union.
17 See Troy and Sheflin, U.S. Union Sourcebook at 3-16 (cited in note 1) (indicating
how changes in union membership reflect the declining share of employment in goods-pro-
ducing industries. See also U.S. Dept. of Labor, 36:4 Employment and Earnings 77, Table
B-1 (Apr 1989); U.S. Dept. of Labor, 112:4 Monthly Labor Review 67, Table 13 (Apr 1989).
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shift of consumer demand from goods to services; 18 a relative in-
crease in the number of professional, managerial, and other white
collar workers;19 faster growth in labor productivity in manufactur-
ing than in other sectors;2" and increased import competition. 21
The effects of these structural changes appear to have been com-
pounded by employment shifts from the northeast and midwest to
the sun belt, where the political environment has traditionally
been less receptive to unionization.22 In addition, deregulation in
various industries was followed by a reduction in union densities.23
It is difficult to isolate and estimate the effects of structural
factors on union density in the United States. Structural changes
have interacted with other factors, such as the apparent increase in
employer opposition to unionization, 4 the apparent reduction in
union organizing activity,25 the reduction in public approval of un-
ions as reflected in public opinion polls, 26 and the increase in em-
ployee opposition to unionization .2  These variables are neither in-
"' The share of total real consumption expenditures represented by services rose from
40.2 percent in 1953 to 46.6 percent in 1988. See Economic Report of the President 1989
317, Table B-7 (GPO, 1989).
19 See Lawrence F. Katz and Ana L. Revenga, Changes in the Structure of Wages: The
U.S. vs. Japan 22, Table 7 (National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper, 1989)
(on file with U Chi L Rev). For an exposition of the considerations that have made "white
collars" (a manifestly loose grouping) more difficult to organize, see Charles C. Heckscher,
The New Unionism 64-71, 259 n 36 (Basic, 1988). See also Thomas Kochan, Collective Bar-
gaining and Industrial Relations 147 (Richard D. Irwin, 1980), rejecting the contention that
white collar workers (except for administrators and professionals) are more reluctant to or-
ganize than other groups when faced with similar working conditions.
20 See U.S. Dept. of Labor, 112:5 Monthly Labor Review 107, Table 44 (May 1989).
" See John M. Abowd and Thomas Lemieux, The Effects of International Competi-
tion on Collective Bargaining Outcomes: A Comparison of the United States and Canada
(National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper, 1990) (on file with U Chi L Rev).
"I See Barry T. Hirsch and John T. Addison, The Economics of Unions: New Ap-
proaches And Evidence 63-64 (Allen and Unwen, 1986).
23 See Nancy Rose, Labor Rent Sharing and Regulation: Evidence from the Trucking
Industry, 95 J Pol Econ 1146 (1987).
24 See Richard Freeman, Contraction and Expansion: The Divergence of Private Sec-
tor and Public Sector Unionism in the United States, 2 J Econ Persp 63, 77, 82, 86 (1988).
2' See Richard Freeman, Why are Unions Faring Poorly in NLRB Representation
Elections, in Thomas A. Kochan, ed, Challenges and Choices Facing American Labor Law
45 (MIT, 1985).
24 See Seymour M. Lipset, North American Labor Movements: A Comparative Per-
spective, in Lipset, ed, Unions in Transition 421, 438 (cited in note 1); James L. Medoff,
The Public's Image of Labor and Labor's Response, 3 Detroit Coll L Rev 609-23 (1987).
Compare Melvin W. Reder, The Rise and Fall of Unions: The Public Sector and Private, 2
J Econ Persp 89, 101 (1986) (opinion polls of uncertain significance because worker disap-
proval of unions might result from anticipation of successful employer resistance rather
than from hostility to union methods or objectives per se).
" See Leo Troy, Will a More Interventionist NLRA Revive Organized Labor?, 13 Harv
J L & Pub Pol 583, 595-601 (1990) (employee opposition is of crucial importance to union
1991]
The University of Chicago Law Review
dependent nor mutually exclusive. Indeed, they often reenforce
each other.28
It is not necessary here to explore competing assessments of
the relative significance of structural and other factors for Ameri-
can deunionization. Instead, we merely note that there is substan-
tial support in the literature for the position that structural and
related changes (even though they are key factors) fail to explain a
significant amount of deunionization.2 9 Consequently, more atten-
tion has been focused on the importance of increased employer op-
position, legal and illegal, for American deunionization.
B. Declining Union Election Successes
Employer opposition has been associated with another cause
of union decline-the sharp reduction in the number of workers
organized through NLRB elections, the most common route to rep-
resentation. 0 As Table 1 shows, during the early 1950s, the total
number of employees in units voting for union representation in
NLRB elections averaged 554,100 per year. Table 1 also shows that
in the 1950s, unions organized approximately 1.3 percent of the
private nonagricultural workforce annually through NLRB elec-
tions."1 Given the sharp increase in that workforce in the years
that followed, equivalent success for unions today would require
them annually to win elections in units totaling 1.1 million work-
ers.3 2 Instead, during the late 1980s, .the total number of employees
decline and makes employer opposition essentially irrelevant).
28 See Farber, 238 Science at 915 (cited in note 7).
29 See Freeman, 2 J Econ Persp at 76 (cited in note 24).
20 American unions generally achieve representation in one of three ways: NLRB elec-
tions; Board unfair labor practice orders; or voluntary recognition by employers. See Philip
Ross, The Labor Law in Action: An Analysis of the Administrative Process under the Taft-
Hartley Act 12, Report to NLRB Chairman McCulloch (1966).
11 This figure encompasses all workers (not merely union members or union supporters)
employed in bargaining units in which unions secured representation rights through an
NLRB election. The number of such workers who are union members is less than this figure,
for two reasons. First, not all workers in such units join the union. Second, a union winning
an election frequently is unable to negotiate a collective bargaining agreement; conse-
quently, its membership base erodes.
We derived the percentages in Table 1, column 2, from the number of employees in
units in which a union secured a majority vote divided by the number of employees in the
private nonagricultural workforce. See 15-53 NLRB Annual Reports (1950-88); Economic
Report of the President 1990 342-43, Table C-43 (GPO, 1989). See also Freeman, 2 J Econ
Persp at 74 (cited in note 24).
" This figure is derived by multiplying average private nonagricultural employment in
1988 (88.2 million) by .013, the fraction of such employment in units voting for union repre-
sentation in the 1950s. See Economic Report of the President 1990 at 342-43, Table C-43
(cited in note 31).
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in such units declined sharply, to 80,300 per year or roughly 0.1
percent of the private nonagricultural workforce."3
TABLE 1
DECLINING UNION SUCCESS IN NLRB ELECTIONS
[Annual Averages During Period]
Newly
Represented Share of Number of Size of Union
Years Employees Work Force Elections Unit Win Rate
1950-54 554,100 1.3% 5906 121 72%
1955-59 277,700 0.6 4731 94 64
1960-64 274,800 0.6 6854 73 58
1965-69 315,800 0.6 7776 73 59
1970-74 254,400 0.4 8298 67 54
1975-79 185,000 0.3 7884 63 49
1980-84 115,500 0.2 5048 60 46
1985-88 80,300 0.1 3558 60 48
Notes: "Newly Represented Employees" refers to the number of eligible voters in units
in which a union secured a majority in collective bargaining ("RC" or "RM") elections.
"Share of Work Force" refers to the number of newly represented employees stated as a
percentage of the private nonagricultural work force. "Number of Elections" refers to the
number of collective bargaining elections. "Size of Unit" refers to the average number of
eligible voters in units holding collective bargaining elections. "Union Win Rate" refers to
percentage of collective bargaining elections won by unions. Sources: 15-53 NLRB Annual
Reports (1950-88); Economic Report of the President 1990 342-43, Table C-43 (GPO, 1989).
This decline reflects the combined effects of reductions in the
number of elections held, in the average size of electoral units, and
in unions' success rates. Thus, Table 1 reveals the following. First,
the decline in numbers of newly organized workers from the 1950s
to the 1980s resulted principally from both a 24-point drop in the
percentage of elections won by unions and a substantial decline in
the average size of electoral units. Second, the decline in the num-
ber of newly organized workers since the late 1970s resulted princi-
pally from a decrease in the number of elections and, to a much
" The declining number of newly organized workers appears to account for a modest
portion of the decline in union densities. Dickens and Leonard suggest that the decline in
union victory rates accounts for seven percentage points of that decline since the 1950s.
William T. Dickens and Jonathan S. Leonard, Accounting for the Decline in Union Mem-
bership, 1950-1980, 38:3 Industrial & Labor Rel Rev 323, 332 (1985). Bronars and Deere
found that between 1973 and 1988, the decline in the number of employees in the units in
which unions secured representation rights accounted for 13 percent of the 13.7 percentage
point decline in the private sector union density. Stephen G. Bronars and Donald R. Deere,
Union Membership, Union Oganizing Activity, and the Union Wage Differential 1973-1988
(unpublished working paper, Oct 1990) (on file with U Chi L Rev).
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lesser extent, from a continued decrease in either union victory
rates or the average size of election units. 4
The smaller average size of election units is at least partially
associated with structural changes in the U.S. economy. The in-
creasing share of employment in the service-producing industries
presumably meant that unions were increasingly faced with or-
ganizing smaller firms in these traditionally unorganized indus-
tries.35 Furthermore, industries in which unions had traditionally
flourished presented similar problems. Thus, because of the in-
crease in the fraction of midsize firms relative to large establish-
ments in capital-intensive industries, elections were more likely to
be held in smaller units even in such industries.3 6 In manufactur-
ing, for example, the average size of election units fell from 133
employees in 1955 to 79 in 1988.s
The declining union success rates are not, however, directly
explicable by structural changes in the economy. As Table 1 shows,
the largest decline in those rates occurred between the 1950s and
1960s, rather than between the 1970s and 1980s, when structural
changes were having their greatest effect. In addition, as Table 2
shows, union success rates have fallen sharply even in traditionally
organized industries. In manufacturing, where most NLRB elec-
tions occurred, unions had a success rate of only 40 percent in the
1980s compared with 69 percent in the 1950s. Thus, the overall
decline in union success rates in NLRB elections can be attributed
34 Between the 1950s and the 1970s, the number of NLRB elections per year rose by 60
percent. This increase somewhat offsets the effects of both the declining union win rates and
the declining average size of electoral units. In the i980s, the union success rate and the
average size of electoral units declined slightly, while the number of NLRB elections
dropped by more than one-half. It is unclear whether the reduced number of elections re-
flected a reduction in investments in organizing activity, an increase in average costs associ-
ated with organizing smaller units, or greater difficulty in securing the support that is a
prerequisite for an NLRB election.
35 Smaller units did not necessarily contribute to the decline in union organizing suc-
cess. During the 1980s, union victory rates in units with fewer than 20 employees were 20
percentage points higher than in units with between 100 and 1,000 employees. See 45-53
NLRB Annual Reports Table 17 (1980-88). Similarly, in collective bargaining elections held
between July 1972 and June 1977, the union win rate declined as the size of the unit in-
creased. See cases closed between July 1972 and June 1977, NLRB Representation Election
Database (NLRB Management and Information Systems Branch).
36 See Steve J. Davis and John Haltiwanger, The Distribution of Employees by Estab-
lishment Size in the U.S. (unpublished working paper, 1989) (on file with U Chi L Rev).
37 In 1980, a year highlighted in Professor Weiler's study, the average size of manufac-
turing election units was 84 employees. See 20 NLRB Annual Report 176, Table 17 (1955);
45 NLRB Annual Report 284, Table 16 (1980); 53 NLRB Annual Report 236, Table 16
(1988).
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TABLE 2
UNION VICTORIES IN ELECTIONS
[Average Annual Percentage Won By Unions]
Industry 1950-59 1980-88
Mining 71% 39%
Construction 78 47
Manufacturing 69 40
Transportation/Communications/
Public Utilities 71 46
Wholesale/Retail Trade 63 38
Finance, Insurance, Real Estate/
Personal and Business Services 73 48
Total Private Sector 68 43
Notes: The columns in the table report for each industry the percentage of NLRB elec-
tions won by unions. The figures include both collective bargaining and decertification elec-
tions. Source: 15-24, 45-53 NLRB Annual Reports Table 18 (1950-59), Table 16 (1980-88).
principally to union election failures in the traditionally organized
sectors of the economy.3 8
C. Increasing Litigation and Employer Lawlessness
While union election successes declined, the number of unfair
labor practice (ULP) charges against employers surged. As shown
by Table 3, during the early 1950s, when union victory rates were
at their peak, unions and employees annually filed an average of
4,344 ULP charges against employers. By contrast, during the
early 1980s, when union win rates were at a low, charges filed
against employers soared to an annual average of nearly 30,000.
An extensive literature concludes that a causal connection ex-
ists between that increase in ULP charges and unions' declining
success rates in NLRB elections."9 That conclusion rests on two
3' In 1988, 60 percent of NLRB elections occurred in traditionally organized sectors:
mining, construction, manufacturing, transportation, communications, and public utilities.
53 NLRB Annual Report 236-37, Table 16 (1988). In that year, those sectors employed only
35 percent of the private nonagricultural work force and an even smaller percentage of the
unorganized work force. See Economic Report of the President 1990 at 342-3, Table C-43
(cited in note 31).
' See Richard B. Freeman and James L. Medoff, What Do Unions Do?, 230-45 (Basic,
1984); Freeman, 2 J Econ Persp at 79 (cited in note 24); Weiler, 96 Harv L Rev at 1769
(cited in note 8); Weiler, 98 Harv L Rev at 351 (cited in note 10); see also The Failure of
Labor Law-A Betrayal of American Workers, Report of Subcommittee on Labor-Manage-
ment Relations, House Committee on Education and Labor, 98th Cong, 2d Sess (1984), re-
printed in Leroy Merrifield, Theodore St. Antoine, and Charles Craver, Labor Relations
Law: Cases and Materials 57-58 (Michie, 8th ed 1989).
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TABLE 3
UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE CHARGES
REMEDIES, AND UNION ELECTION-WIN RATES
[Annual Averages for 5-Year Periods]
Back Pay in Employees Bargaining Union
Total 8(a)(3) 8(a)(5) 1988 Dollars Offered Begun or Win Rate
Years Charges Charges Charges (1,000s) Reinstatement Resumed in Elections
1950-54 4,344 3,035 1,266 $ 6,193 2,194 234 72%
1955-59 5,175 3,993 1,046 3,474 9,437 119 64
1960-64 9,067 6,746 2,279 7,563 2,876 485 58
1965-69 11,401 7,657 3,902 15,682 4,638 1,204 59
1970-74 16,428 10,684 5,306 14,727 4,317 1,520 54
1975-79 25,213 15,912 7,420 25,832 4,817 1,726 49
1980-84 28,830 15,736 10,628 41,984 6,844 2,107 46
1985-88 22,843 11,821 9,644 38,248 5,647 2,597 48
Notes: See Table 1 for a definition of "Union Win Rate." "Total Charges," "8(a)(3)
Charges," and "8(a)(5) Charges" are average number of unfair labor practice allegations
filed against employers annually. 15-53 NLRB Annual Reports Table 3 (1950), Table 2
(1951-88). "Back Pay" refers to awards to employees in thousands of 1988 dollars as a result
of a Board order or settlement between the parties under the aegis of the Board. "Employ-
ees Offered Reinstatement" refers to number of employees offered reinstatement as a result
of a Board order or settlement. "Bargaining Begun or Resumed" refers to number of times
an employer begins or resumes collective bargaining as a result of a Board order or settle-
ment. In 1959, 41,200 employees were offered reinstatement. Excluding that unusual year
from the tables reduces the average number of persons offered reinstatement annually be-
tween 1955 and 1959 from 9,437 to 1,496. 15-53 NLRB Annual Reports Table 4 (1950-88).
interrelated contentions. First, after the mid-1950s, employers had
stronger incentives to use borderline or flatly illegal tactics in their
anti-union campaigns. Second, increased resort to such tactics not
only led to the surge in ULP charges but also frustrated or discour-
aged union organizing efforts and contributed significantly to the
decline of unions.
As background for assessing these contentions, we offer a
greatly oversimplified description of the protections provided by
the NLRA, as amended.40 The NLRA establishes the right of em-
ployees to join, or refrain from joining, unions. It also proscribes
"interference" with, or "discrimination" because of, the exercise of
those rights.41 The NLRA also provides for machinery that enables
employees to vote by secret ballot on whether they want union rep-
resentation. 2 In administering that machinery, the NLRB defines
an "appropriate" unit for bargaining and monitors employer and
,0 29 USC §§ 151-169 (1988).
41 29 USC §§ 151, 157, 158(a).
42 "Collective bargaining elections" generally involve voting by unrepresented employ-
ees on whether they want union representation; in "decertification elections" employees vote
on the retention of an incumbent union. See 53 NLRB Annual Report 182 (1988); 29 USC §
159(e).
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union conduct both before and during elections.4" Finally, § 8(a)(5)
requires an employer to bargain in "good faith" with a union that
represents a majority of its employees in an appropriate unit.44
Commentators have stressed the Act's increasing ineffective-
ness in deterring discriminatory discharges, in protecting employee
free choice, and in enforcing an employer's duty to bargain with a
certified union.45 For supporting evidence, they have pointed to the
increase in the number of employees awarded backpay or offered
reinstatement. As Table 3 shows, from the 1950s to the 1980s, the
amount of backpay awarded annually increased ninefold (even af-
ter adjusting for inflation). The increase in the number of employ-
ees covered by reinstatement offers, although less dramatic, is sub-
stantial.46 Finally, the instances in which employers began or
resumed collective bargaining because of a Board order or a settle-
ment (reached under its aegis) increased more than tenfold be-
tween the 1950s and the 1980s.
Proponents of the rogue employer thesis attribute the appar-
ent surge in violations to several features of the regulatory machin-
ery. First, there is the notorious delay between the filing of a "mer-
itorious charge" (that is, one that warrants the issuance of a
complaint by the NLRB General Counsel) and a Board decision.
For fiscal year 1988, the median interval between the filing of
charges and Board adjudication was 762 days.47 Furthermore, prior
to judicial enforcement, there are no sanctions for noncompliance
with a Board order based on a finding of a violation.4" In fiscal year
43 The Board extensively regulates pre-election campaigning and may invalidate elec-
tion results when such campaigning fails the "laboratory conditions" test. Such failures may
fall short of an unfair labor practice because the Board is not restricted by the Act's pro-
scriptions of unfair labor practices in monitoring pre-election activities. See generally Ken-
neth C. McGuiness and Jeffrey A. Norris, How to Take a Case Before the NLRB 221-30
(BNA, 5th ed 1986).
44 29 USC § 158(a)(5).
45 See Weiler, 96 Harv L Rev at 1778-81 (cited in note 8); Weiler, 98 Harv L Rev at
358-62 (cited in note 10). See also Freeman and Medoff, What Do Unions Do? at 233-39
(cited in note 39).
46 In calculating that increase, we included an outlier year, namely, 1959, when 41,200
employees were offered reinstatement as a result of 32 cases in the trucking industry. With
that year excluded, the annual average for the late 1950s falls to 1,496, and the average
annual number of reinstatements rises fourfold between the 1950s and the 1980s. See 24
NLRB Annual Report 164, Table 4 n 2 (1959).
47 53 NLRB Annual Report 248, Table 23 (1988).
4, Because of noncompliance, a substantial percentage of Board orders are judically re-
viewed. In 1988, 32 percent of the Board's orders against employers required judicial en-
forcement. That percentage has varied over time. The corresponding percentage was 62 per-
cent in 1955 and 40 percent in 1980. 20 NLRB Annual Report 166, Table 8 (1955); 45 NLRB
Annual Report 256, Table 7 (1980); 53 NLRB Annual Report 206-07, Table 7 (1988). See
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1988, the median time between a Board order and judicial enforce-
ment was 430 days.49 Thus, the median interval between filing a
charge and judicial enforcement of an order was 1,192 days, or over
three years.
The second element of the machinery that proponents of the
rogue employer thesis cite is the ineffectiveness of these belated
remedies. A Board remedy, even after judicial enforcement, may
not be sufficiently burdensome to deter future violations. Discrimi-
natorily discharged employees are entitled only to the gross pay
they would have earned from the employer less the pay they actu-
ally (or should have) earned following their discharge.5 0 A lawless
employer may consider the cost of that remedy (discounted by the
probability of detection) warranted by the potential contribution
of discriminatory discharges to an anti-union campaign. Such dis-
charges discourage pro-union support by signaling to other em-
ployees that their support for a union may cost them their jobs. If
discriminatory discharges avert or substantially delay union organ-
ization, the cost to the firm from a Board remedy may be less than
the increased labor costs and the loss of managerial autonomy that
are likely to result from a union victory.51
Proponents of the rogue employer thesis have also focused on
employer illegalities that occur after Board certification of a union.
Thus, an employer might benefit by refusing to negotiate at all
with such a union or by engaging in "sham" bargaining (that is,
bargaining not intended to lead to an agreement). During the pro-
tracted period in which the unfair labor practice case against the
employer is being processed, employee support for the union, as
also Edward B. Miller, An Administrative Appraisal of the NLRB 26, 135, Table 1 (Penn-
sylvania, rev ed 1978). The declining ratio of orders requiring judicial enforcement works
against the rogue employer thesis.
49 Table B: Comparison of Median Time (Days) Elapsed in Processing Cases Panel I
(supplied by NLRB Executive Secretary) (on file with U Chi L Rev).
50 See Charles J. Morris, ed, The Developing Labor Law 1634 n 6 (BNA, 2d ed 1983).
5 In determining whether a Board proceeding is likely to restore an allegedly victim-
ized employee to his job, a distinction must be drawn between reinstatement offers resulting
from Board orders and from settlements. One study indicates that only 5 percent of employ-
ees offered reinstatement more than six months after their discriminatory discharges ac-
cepted such an offer. Typically much more time elapses between a discriminatory discharge
and a Board reinstatement order. See U.S. General Accounting Office, Concerns Regarding
Impact of Employee Charges Against Employers for Unfair Labor Practices (GPO, 1982)
("GAO Study") (study presented as report to House Subcommittee on Labor-Management
Relations). Most reinstatement offers arise, however, from settlements, as distinguished
from Board orders. Furthermore, such settlements usually are reached quickly, and employ-
ees generally.accept reinstatement offers called for by the settlement terms-70 percent in
fiscal year 1988. 53 NLRB Annual Report 195, Table 4 (1988).
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well as the union's ability to organize an effective strike, may dis-
appear. Finally, when the Board holds that a violation occurred, it
usually will order the employer only to resume bargaining with the
union. A lawless employer whose unlawful stonewalling does not
precipitate a strike may have postponed, for a substantial time,
any increase in labor costs resulting from the unionization of its
facility.
D. The Significance of Employer Illegalities
The rogue employer thesis emphasizes the surge, from 1950 to
1980, in the number of unfair labor practice charges, in the amount
of backpay awards, and in the number of workers ordered by the
NLRB to be offered reinstatement by employers. Professor Weiler,
an eminent exponent, if not the father, of this thesis, presents Ta-
ble 4 as the basis of his conclusions.52
TABLE 4
UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES BY EMPLOYERS, 1950-1980
Certification
Year Elections
1950 5619
1955 4215
1957 4729
1960 6380
1965 7576
1970 7773
1975 8061
1980 7296
Charges
Against
Employers
Fraction
§ 8(a)3 Found
Charges Meritorious
4472 3213
4362 3089 NA
3655 2789 NA
7723 6044 29.1%
(overall)
10,931 7367 35.5%
(overall)
13,601 9290 34.2%
(overall)
20,311 13,426 32.3%
(employer)
30.2%
(overall)
31,281 18,315 39.0%
(employer)
35.7%
(overall)
Backpay
Awards
(Average
Amount)
2259
($477)
1836
($428)
1457
($354)
3110
($335)
4644
($599)
6828
($403)
7405
($1524)
15,642
($2054)
Reinstatees
2111
1275
922
1885
5875
3779
3816
10,033
Note: Reproduced from Paul Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing Workers' Rights to
Self Organization under the NLRA, 96 Harv L Rev 1769, 1780, Table H (1983).
52 See Weiler, 96 Harv L Rev at 1780, Table II (cited in note 8); see also id at 1769,'
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From that table, Professor Weiler draws two problematic con-
clusions. First, he suggests that about 10,000 workers were fired in
1980 for involvement in representation campaigns.53 Second, gener-
alizing beyond 1980, he states: "Astoundingly,... the current odds
are about one in twenty that a union supporter will be fired for
exercising rights supposedly guaranteed by federal law" 54-a ratio
that has so often been repeated5 as virtually to have become part
of labor relations folklore.
Professor Weiler highlights the 10,033 reinstatees in 1980,
without mentioning three troublesome points. First, the 1980 fig-
ure is obviously a substantial departure from the much lower 1975
figure and from the average of prior and subsequent years, as is
shown in Table 3. Second, the number of reinstatees and the
amount of backpay, although on an uptrend beginning in 1950,
shows considerable fluctuation. By contrast, the decline in the un-
ions' election success rate from the early 1950s to the early 1980s
has been steady and progressive, failing to reflect the substantial
year-to-year variations in backpay awards and the number of rein-
statees. This failure suggests that other factors may be more im-
portant than employer misconduct in unions' organizational
defeats.
Third, Weiler glosses over the fact that the 10,000 reinstatees
in 1980 arose from all unfair labor practice charges, not just from
those that were representation-related. Consequently, the estimate
that 10,000 employees "were fired in 1980 for involvement in rep-
resentation campaigns ' 56 is questionable. As we will develop be-
53 Id at 1781. Weiler's 10,000 figure for 1980 is based on the following argument: Virtu-
ally all of the 10,000 employees entitled to reinstatement were discharged during organiza-
tional campaigns. Id. The Board obtained backpay for another 5,000 in 1980, many of whom
had been fired but had settled for monetary relief, without reinstatement. Finally, other
workers were illegally fired, but charges covering them were not filed or could not be sub-
stantiated. Id. Below we consider the difficulties with the foregoing argument.
Id. Weiler has, however, also said that "most employers still do fight within the legal
rules of the contest." See Paul Weiler, The Representation Gap in the American Work-
place (unpublished manuscript, Aug 1988), quoted in Troy, 13 Harv J L & Pub Pol at 595
(cited in note 27).
"' Weiler's ratio is set forth in Freeman and Medoff, What Do Unions Do? at 233 n 12
(cited in note 39); The Failure of Labor Law-A Betrayal of American Workers, in Merri-
field, St. Antoine, and Craver, Labor Relations Law (cited in note 39); Charles B. Craver,
Th NLRA at Fifty: From Youthful Exuberance to Middle-Aged Complacency, 36 Labor L
J 604, 612 (1985), quoted by U.S. Dept. of Labor, Labor Law and the Future of Labor-
Management Cooperation 9 (BMLR No 104, 1986); Statement of Chairman William Clay
before the House Labor Subcommittee on Labor-Management Relations on Enforcement of
Landrum-Griffin Act Provisions, 26 Daily Labor Rep (BNA) E-1 (Feb 8, 1984).
"' Weiler, 96 Harv L Rev at 1781 (cited in note 8).
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low,57 § 8(a)(3) not only proscribes such firings but also extends far
beyond the organizational context. Furthermore, during the 1960s,
interpretations of that section generated new grounds for NLRB
backpay orders that enabled large numbers of employees to receive
a remedy for employer misconduct in contexts far removed from
organizational campaigns.
Recognizing that not all discriminatory discharges are repre-
sentation related, Professor Weiler relies primarily on a 1978 esti-
mate by the NLRB's General Counsel that 90 percent of such dis-
charges would occur during either organizational campaigns or first
contract negotiations.58 Reliance on that estimate, however,
presents several difficulties. First, discharges during first contract
negotiations usually occur after a union has won an election. Con-
sequently, a union's loss of an election cannot be attributed to such
discharges even though they might lead to a union's subsequent
loss of majority support or might adversely affect unions in other
elections. More important, the General Counsel presented the 90
percent estimate under circumstances that impair that figure's use-
fulness in determining the percentage of charges and violations of
§ 8(a)(3) arising from the organizational context. The General
Counsel did not indicate the basis for that estimate. Furthermore,
he did not even purport to reflect data collected under existing leg-
islation. Rather, the figure was merely a forecast of the added
workload for the General Counsel's office59 if the proposed Labor
Reform Act of 1977 were enacted.6 0 That act would have imposed
11 See notes 72-81 and accompanying text.
68 See Weiler, 96 Harv L Rev at 1781 n 35 (cited in note 8).
'" John Irving, the NLRB's general counsel when the Board made its 90 percent esti-
mate, criticized the 1:20 ratio (see text at note 54), urging, as Weiler had indicated, that
most reinstatements resulted from settlements without any adjudication of a violation. See
John Irving, The Board's Representation Process: Another View, in Charles J. Morris, ed,
American Labor Policy 108, 111 (BNA, 1987). See also Departments of Labor and Health,
Education and Welfare Appropriations for 1979, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on the
Departments of Labor and Health, Education and Welfare of the House Committee on Ap-
propriations, 95th Cong, 2d Sess 742, 744, 760-761 (1978) ("House Hearings").
60 See HR 8410, 95th Cong, 1st Sess 52 (Oct 7, 1977), reprinted in Labor Law Reform
Act of 1978, Hearings on HR 8410 before the Senate Committee on Human Resources, 95th
Cong, 2d Sess 3 (1978) ("Senate Hearings"). The Labor Reform Act, if enacted, would have
created stronger incentives for employees to file charges alleging that violations of § 8(a)(3)
had occurred during an organizational campaign or in the interval between recognition of a
union and the negotiation of a first contract. The proposed changes in the existing legisla-
tion included: (1) double pay for victimized employees, which was later reduced in the Sen-
ate to 1.5 times the amount of lost wages (see S 2467, § 9(4), 95th Cong, 2d Sess (1978),
reprinted in Senate Hearings at 45 and 61); (2) priority treatment by the NLRB; (3) interim
injunctive relief; and (4) a requirement for reinstatement of discharged employees pending
the NLRB's resolution of the charges prompted by their termination. The bill, however,
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additional responsibilities on the General Counsel's office in rela-
tion to employees allegedly discharged during an organizational
campaign or prior to a first contract. The General Counsel, urging
that these added responsibilities called for a larger appropriation,
presented the 90 percent estimate without specifying its basis.
Plainly, such an unsupported estimate that was the opening gam-
bit in an appropriations hearing is a shaky basis for projecting the
mix of § 8(a)(3) charges in a different legal environment.
More important than the accuracy of the General Counsel's or
Professor Weiler's estimates regarding the context of discrimina-
tory discharges is whether there has been a causal relationship be-
tween such discharges and the steep and steady decline in union
success rates in NLRB elections. Professor Weiler acknowledges
that the study by Getman, Goldberg, and Herman6 poses a major
challenge to the existence of such a relationship, but he and others
criticize the methodology and the conclusion of that study. 2 This
question of causality has received a good deal of attention," and
died in the Senate (see 124 Cong Rec 18,399-400 (June 22, 1978)), and the incentives that it
would have created did not materialize. Consequently, the General Counsel's 90 percent
estimate is flawed as an indicator of the percentage of § 8(a)(3) charges arising from an
organizational context under existing legislation.
Greater backpay liability would have increased the incentive for filing charges and, ac-
cordingly, the deterrent against unlawful discharges. Because the government provides
counsel, litigation expenses would not have been a substantial restraint on filing such
charges-including dubious ones-but might well have affected the willingness of the
Board's staff to issue a complaint and to prosecute or settle it. The net result of these con-
flicting considerations is uncertain, but it seems likely that the reduction in the ratio of
litigation costs to the liability involved would have hampered settlements. See Miller, An
Administrative Appraisal at 118, 121-22 (cited in note 48). For details of the estimate by
the Board's General Counsel and Chairman of the increased workload that would have re-
sulted from the enactment of HR 8410, see House Hearings at 745 (cited in note 59).
61 Julius G. Getman, Stephen B. Goldberg, and Jeanne B. Herman, Union Representa-
tion Elections: Law & Reality (Russell Sage, 1976). Getman et al responded to their critics
in Stephen B. Goldberg, Julius G. Getman, and Jeanne M. Brett, Union Representation
Elections: Law & Reality: The Authors Respond to the Critics, 79 Mich L Rev 564 (1981).
See also Laura Cooper, Authorization Cards and Union Representation Election Outcome:
An Empirical Assessment of the Assumption Underlying the Supreme Court's Gissel Deci-
sion, 79 Nw U L Rev 87 (1984).
62 Weiler, 96 Harv L Rev at 1782-83 (cited in note,8); William T. Dickens, The Effect of
Company Campaigns on Certification Elections: Law and Reality Once Again, 36 Indus-
trial & Labor Rel 560, 561 (1983).
63 See references in Bernard D. Meltzer and Stanley D. Henderson, Labor Law: Cases,
Materials, and Problems 115 n i, 117 nn j & k, 119 n m (Little, Brown, 3d ed 1985). See
Robert F. Flanagan, Labor Relations and the Litigation Explosion ch 4 (Brookings Institu-
tion, 1987) (expressing doubt, at 58-59, about a causal connection between unlawful dis-
charges (among other violations) and election outcomes). Indeed, some studies have empha-
sized that discriminatory discharges may backfire and encourage, rather than discourage,
organization. See Hoyt W. Wheeler and John A. McClendon, The Individual Decision to
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we do not intend to revisit it here. Instead, we propose to highlight
aspects of the legal environment that have sometimes been ne-
glected in discussions of the rogue employer thesis and the increase
in unfair labor practice charges and complaints.
The neglected legal factors include: an expansion in the
NLRB's effective and statutory jurisdiction, the frequency with
which charges and findings of violations of §§ 8(a)(3) and 8(a)(5) of
the NLRA arise out of contexts remote from either organizational
campaigns or first-contract negotiations, and changes in NLRB
doctrine that appear to have increased both the propensity to file
charges against employers and the number of backpay awards, par-
ticularly the number of awards involving large amounts of money
and large numbers of reinstatees. An exploration of those matters,
as well as our study of Board adjudications and settlements, will
show the flaws in both the well-known 1:20 ratio and the conclu-
sion that increases in charges of employer unfair labor practices
have been a major factor in U.S. deunionization.
II. LEGISLATIVE AND DOCTRINAL FRAMEWORK
A. The Expanding Jurisdiction of the NLRB
Beginning in the 1960s, inflation as well as administrative and
statutory changes expanded the Board's docket. Although inflation
appears to have caused only a modest expansion, 4 a much larger
and potentially significant increase resulted from the extension of
the Board's jurisdiction through administration and legislation.
Thus, its jurisdiction was extended to private and nonprofit col-
leges or universities,65 United States postal employees,66 proprie-
tary hospitals,67 nursing homes,"' and non-profit hospitals. 9
Unionize 47, 65, in George W. Strauss, ed, The State of the Unions (Industrial Relations
Research Association, 1991); John J. Lawler, Unionization and Deunionization: Strategy,
Tactics, and Outcomes 231 (South Carolina, 1990).
64 The Board, under its 1958 yardsticks, would exercise its statutory jurisdiction over a
firm only if its annual volume of business met the minimum prescribed by the applicable
yardstick. See NLRB Press Release, R 576 (Oct 2, 1958). Congress in 1959 barred the Board
from raising these minima, and, accordingly, appeared to have barred the Board from taking
account of the results of inflation. Landrum-Griffin Act, 29 USC § 164(c)(1) (1982). See
Bernard D. Meltzer and Robert J. LaLonde, Inflation & the NLRB: A Case of Fortuitous
Regulatory Expansion, Regulation 43 (Sept-Oct 1980). But given the relatively low dollar
amounts embodied in the Board's 1958 yardsticks, it is doubtful that inflation caused "a
large increase in the Board's docket." Flanagan, Labor Relations and the Litigation Explo-
sion at 31-32 (cited in note 63).
65 Cornell University, 183 NLRB 329 (1970); 35 Fed Reg 18370 (Dec 3, 1970).
" Act of August 12, 1970, 39 USC § 1209 (1988).
67 Butte Medical Properties, 168 NLRB 266, 267-68 (1967).
" University Nursing Home, Inc., 168 NLRB 263, 264 (1967).
" Act of July 26, 1974, 29 USC §§ 152(2), (14).
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Professor Flanagan has estimated that this jurisdictional ex-
pansion accounted at most for a 20-25 percent increase in charges
filed with the Board. 0 Under the higher end of that estimate, 25
percent of the increased charges against employers might have re-
sulted from the expansion in the Board's jurisdiction, rather than
from an increase in employer misconduct. Even though this juris-
dictionally-related increase is far from negligible, it has sometimes
been neglected in attempts to measure and explain increased em-
ployer violations, actual and alleged.71
B. The Applicability of Section 8(a)(3) Outside the Organiza-
tional Context
Similarly, there has sometimes been a failure to appreciate the
extent to which § 8(a)(3) provides the basis for backpay and rein-
statement in situations far removed from the organizational con-
text. Section 8(a)(3) may operate to protect a single employee
seeking either to induce some form of group action other than an
election or to invoke a right established by a collective bargaining
agreement.72 It may also operate when an employer closes or relo-
cates a unionized plant in order to escape unionization. But most
important for our immediate purposes has been the application of
§ 8(a)(3) to disputes arising out of established and actual or al-
leged bargaining impasses. Such disputes may, for example, arise
from strikes or lockouts followed by the hiring or retention of
replacements. 73
70 See Flanagan, Labor Relations and the Litigation Explosion at 30-32 (cited in note
63). Expansion of the NLRB's jurisdiction would presumably increase the NLRB's unfair
labor practice docket in general. Although Weiler focused on discriminatory discharges in
the organizational context, he also referred to the increase in ULPs in other contexts. See
Weiler, 96 Harv L Rev at 1769 (cited in note 8). Furthermore, jurisdictional expansion
would presumably lead to an increase in § 8(a)(3) charges and violations arising both from
established bargaining relationships and organizational contexts. Nonetheless, such an ex-
pansion might not affect the ratio of discriminatory discharges to pro-union voters in NLRB
elections. Presumably, such an expansion would affect both the denominator (the number of
pro-union voters in NLRB elections) and the numerator (the number of discriminatorily
discharged union supporters). There is scant basis for suggesting that a different ratio would
emerge in areas newly subjected to NLRB jurisdiction.
I1 For example, Weiler, 96 Harv L Rev at 1769 (cited in note 8), does not mention
jurisdictional changes.
7'2 NLRB v City Disposal Systems, Inc., 465 US 822, 831 (1984).
"' Such measures of economic warfare in the context of established bargaining relation-
ships are covered by an intricate body of regulation, only a few aspects of which will be
touched on here. That regulation distinguishes between "economic strikes" (those seeking
better terms or conditions of employment) and "unfair labor practice strikes" (those caused
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Unfair labor practice charges are likely to be filed after an em-
ployer hires replacements and denies reinstatement to strikers.
When such charges are upheld, Board remedial orders tend to in-
volve many more employees and much more backpay than do
Board remedies for discriminatory discharges in the organizing
context. In addition, litigation precipitated by retention of replace-
ments and denial of reinstatement to strikers is likely to be hard-
fought and protracted because of the competition between strikers
and replacements for the same jobs, the labor movement's tradi-
tional repugnance for "scabs," and the employer's potentially high
backpay liability. Consequently, there tends to be an even greater
than usual time lag between the occurrence of the alleged offense
and the remedy ordered by the Board or embodied in a settlement.
The tendency of unusually high backpay awards, as well as
protracted proceedings, to arise from resort to replacements for
strikers or from employers' rejection of strikers' back-to-work
offers is illustrated by three well-known cases: Kohler Co.,74
NLRB v Erie Resistor Corp.,7 5 and American Cyanamid Co. v
or prolonged by an employer's unfair labor practices). See generally Robert A. Gorman, Ba-
sic Text on Labor Law, Unionization, and Collective Bargaining 339-49 (West, 1976). "Eco-
nomic strikers" are in general entitled to get their jobs back upon making an unconditional
back-to-work offer only if they have not been permanently replaced. "Unfair labor practice
strikers" have more statutory protection. Even though their employer has purported to hire
"permanent replacements," such strikers are entitled to bump those replacements by mak-
ing an unconditional offer to return to work. Furthermore, a change in Board doctrine dur-
ing the 1960s expanded the protection accorded to unfair labor practice strikers by preserv-
ing their reinstatement rights even though they had engaged in misconduct-such as
violence, actual or threatened-that would not have been protected but for the employer's
unfair labor practice. See discussion in note 74.
74 128 NLRB 1062, 1102-08 (1960). In Kohler, the Board had ruled that even unfair
labor practice strikers could be lawfully fired for engaging in normally unprotected activi-
ties, such as violence against strike replacements. The reviewing court rejected that position
on the ground that the Board should have applied the Thayer doctrine. See NLRB v
Thayer Co., 213 F2d 748 (1st Cir 1954). Under Thayer, the Board, in connection with a
potential reinstatement award, "must consider both the seriousness of the employer's un-
lawful acts and the seriousness of the employees' misconduct." See Local 833, UAW v
NLRB, 300 F2d 699, 702 (DC Cir 1962). For later stages of this case, see Kohler II, 148
NLRB 1434 (1964) (on remand), aff'd per curiam by an equally divided court, 345 F2d 748
(DC Cir 1965). The Board's reinstatement order after remand covered approximately 1,800
employees. See 148 NLRB at 1453. The final settlement was for $3 million in backpay and
$1.5 million in pension adjustments distributed to approximately 1,800 employees. See 31
NLRB Annual Report 13 (1966); 243 Daily Labor Rep (BNA) AA-1 (Dec 17, 1965); 244
Daily Labor Rep (BNA) A-14 to A-17 (Dec 20, 1965); 251 Daily Labor Rep (BNA) A-7 (Dec
30, 1965). Furthermore, the Board, before its supplemental decision in Kohler, had an-
nounced its acquiescence to the Thayer doctrine. See Blades Manufacturing Corp., 144
NLRB 561, 567 (1963), enforcement denied on other grounds, 344 F2d 998 (8th Cir 1965).
76 373 US 221 (1963). In Erie Resistor, the Court addressed the question of job entitle-
ments some time after a strike settlement when layoffs became necessary. It upheld the
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NLRB. 6 The American Cyanamid case is a dramatic illustration.
Its settlement, which was reflected in the NLRB's annual report
for the 1980 fiscal year," was the largest in the Board's history to
that date and called for approximately $10.5 million in backpay,
plus $1.4 million in interest. That settlement, moreover, accounted
for more than one-third of the total backpay resulting from orders
issued, or settlements approved by, the Board in fiscal 1980.
The disposition of one big case like American Cyanamid may
contribute significantly to substantial year-to-year fluctuations in
backpay entitlements. Plainly, the disposition of such cases in one
year rather than another results from the vagaries of the litigation
or settlement process. The accidental nature of the time of disposi-
tion underscores the potential for error in implying a causal link
between the amount of backpay granted, or the number of employ-
ees offered reinstatement, in a given year and union election suc-
cess rates in the same or proximate year(s). Specifically, such risks
arise from highlighting one year-1980-as the high point for
backpay entitlements and reinstatements and as the low point for
union victories in NLRB elections.78
Large backpay orders based on § 8(a)(3) violations may arise
not only from work stoppages but also from the closing of part or
all of a plant in order to escape unionization. The well-known
groundbreaking case of Textile Workers Union v Darlington Man-
ufacturing Co. 79 is illustrative. In that case, the closing of a
Board's condemnation of an employer's grant of superseniority to those who had worked
during the strike-a grant that would have insured that full-term strikers would be laid off
before permanent replacements or strike-defectors. The Board had held superseniority un-
lawful regardless of whether granting it was necessary for hiring replacements. In Erie Re-
sistor, at least 129, and possibly more than 200, strikers benefited from the backpay order.
See the Board decision and the trial examiner's report, 132 NLRB 621, 621-24, 646 (1961).
76 592 F2d 356 (7th Cir 1979). During an economic strike, the employer, without bar-
gaining with the union, permanently subcontracted work out of the bargaining unit, thereby
committing an unfair labor practice and converting the strike into an unfair labor practice
strike. Subsequently, the company rejected the strikers' unconditional back-to-work offers,
made after the union had rejected the company's request for a one-year strike ban. The
court upheld the Board's determination that the company had violated § 8(a)(3).
"" See 247 Daily Labor Rep (BNA) A-8 (Dec 22, 1979). That settlement, reached on
approximately December 22, 1979, fell within the NLRB's 1980 fiscal year, which ran from
October 1979 through September 1980. See 45 NLRB Annual Report (1980).
71 See Weiler, 96 Harv L Rev at 1776, 1780-81 (cited in note 8), for an illustration of
this risky procedure. But as Weiler emphasizes, despite year-to-year variation in reinstatees
and backpay awards, both tended to increase substantially from 1955 to 1980.
9 380 US 263 (1965). The Court rejected the NLRB's holding that an employer, even if
it completely closes its business, violates § 8(a)(3) if closure was prompted by a desire to
avoid unionization. See Darlington Manufacturing Co., 139 NLRB 241, 251-52 (1962). The
Court distinguished the liquidation of an entire business from the closing of a plant that is
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plant-a part of a larger enterprise-after the union had won an
election in the plant was ultimately held to be a violation of
§ 8(a)(3). On December 3, 1980, the parties settled the backpay
claims for $5 million-some 14 years after the plant closing.8 0
More recent developments also indicate that § 8(a)(3) cases
involving large backpay payments and reinstatement offers to
many employees often arise out of bargaining, rather than election,
contexts. These cases are briefly described in the unusually long
footnote below.81
part of a larger enterprise. Such a partial closing violates § 8(a)(3) if the employer's interest
in another business is substantial enough to "promise . .. a benefit" from discouraging
unionism there, the closing had that purpose, and the employer's relationship with the other
business makes it "realistically foreseeable" that its employees will fear that their organiza-
tional activities will lead to closure. See 380 US at 275-76. On remand, the Board found a
violation of § 8(a)(3). Darlington Manufacturing Co., 165 NLRB 1074 (1967), enf'd Dar-
lington Manufacturing Co. v NLRB, 397 F2d 760 (4th Cir 1968).
80 See NLRB, Office of General Counsel, Press Release, R-1625 (Dec 3, 1980). Five hun-
dred and fifty employees had begun the 1956 organizational campaign, which led to the
union's certification. See Patricia Eames, The History of the Litigation in Darlington as an
Exercise in Administrative Procedure, 5 U Toledo L Rev 595, 595 (1974). The NLRB Re-
gional Director maintained that the Board's order (even though it mentioned only "employ-
ees") entitled all personnel, including supervisors, who had lost jobs because of the closing
to reinstatement and backpay. Id at 601-02; see Darlington Manufacturing Co., 139 NLRB
at 254-55, 261. The Board had not ordered the reopening of the closed plant; instead, it
ordered the parties to bargain for preferential hiring of the former employees for jobs in the
company's other plants. Id at 258-59, 261. This bargaining failed, and none of the employees
was employed in the other plants. See Eames, 5 U Toledo L Rev at 602-03.
"' See 130 Labor Rel Rep (BNA) 465-66 (Apr 17, 1989). The amount of the backpay
and the context of the claim, as set forth in the NLRB General Counsel's Quadrennial
Report for FY 1984 through FY 1988, appear below; supplementary information supplied by
the NLRB's General Counsel's office in response to the authors' request appears in paren-
theses. See Norton J. Come, Deputy Associate General Counsel, Letter to Bernard D. Melt-
zer (May 9, 1989) (on file with U Chi L Rev).
(a) Con Agra: $7 million in backpay to 1,700 potential claimants (successor employer
did not hire a majority of former employees; charges of §§ 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3) violations but
not of § 8(a)(5) because union not seeking recognition through Board's processes).
(b) Marlene Industries Corp., 255 NLRB 1446 (1981): seven plant locations, $1.3 mil-
lion backpay to 300 discriminatees (organizational campaign begun in 1965 but no election
occurred). The Board held that the employees had struck in protest against an unfair labor
practice (discharge of another employee for engaging in protected activity). The disputed
activities occurred in 1970. The ALJ referred to the employer's massive violations in re-
sponse to the union's organizational campaign that began in 1965. Id at 1456. But the dis-
pute resolved in this case does not appear to have been connected with an immediate
election.
(c) United Mine Workers (A.T. Massey Coal): Over 150 unfair labor practice charges,
several contempt-of-court actions, and a cease-and-desist order applying to the Interna-
tional, the Districts, and over 350 locals in three states (picket-line misconduct case arising
from an economic strike following bargaining impasse).
(d) Communication Workers of America (Southwestern Bell), 828 F2d 479 (8th Cir
1987): Ten unions in 200 locations and $180,000 in dues reimbursement for 575 employees
(employees filed § 8(b)(1)(A) failure-to-represent charge against the union based on union's
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C. New Incentives for Section 8(a)(3) and Section 8(a)(5) Charges
in the Organizational Context
Adjudicative and legislative developments in 1959 and in the
1960s provided new incentives for filing unfair labor practice
charges against employers, particularly charges of §§ 8(a)(1),
8(a)(3), and 8(a)(5) violations. One important development was
Bernel Foam Products Co., Inc.,2 which held that a union, even
after losing an election, could maintain a refusal to bargain charge,
together with other unfair labor practice charges, based on the em-
ployer's conduct between the filing of an election petition and the
election. The Board, however, also held that a bargaining order
based on such preelection conduct would issue only if the Board
set aside the election."'
Unlawful discharges, among other forms of coercion, were
grounds for upsetting an election. Hence, after a union lost an elec-
tion, Bernel Foam created strong new incentives for charging em-
ployers with such discharges in the representation context.8 4 In
receipt of dues deductions after employee revocation of authorization to employer to check
off dues).
(e) United Food and Commercial Workers International Union v NLRB (Spencer
Foods), 768 F2d 1463 (DC Cir 1985): $9 million in backpay to 264 discriminatees (case in-
volved a bargaining deadlock, a plant closure, a dispute as to "successorship," and discrimi-
nation in hiring former employees when plant was reopened). For an analysis of the case,
see 50 NLRB Annual Report 107-08 (1985).
(f) C.E. Natco, 282 NLRB 314 (1986): $2.6 million in backpay to 1,100 discriminatees
(dispute during bargaining for new contract, followed by unlawful lockout).
(g) Southern Florida Hotel & Motel Ass'n (Doral Hotels), 245 NLRB 561, 577 (1979):
$7 million in backpay to 300 discriminatees (contract dispute resulting in economic strike).
(h) Dillingham Ship: $3 million in backpay to up to 1,500 claimants (bad faith bargain-
ing, unilateral contract changes, and discharge of "a number" of employees after alleged
sabotage).
(i) ILWU (PMA): $1.2 million in backpay to 1,700 claimants (massive hiring hall
violations).
82 146 NLRB 1277 (1964) (overruling Louis Aiello, 110 NLRB 1365, 1370 (1954)).
83 See Irving Air Chute Co., Inc., 149 NLRB 627, 630 (1964), enf'd, 350 F2d 176 (2d Cir
1965). Two other considerations increased the importance of the developments described
above. First, under § 9(c)(3) of the NLRA, after a valid election, another election is barred
for a year. 29 USC § 159(c)(3). Second, under § 8(b)(7)(B), recognition or organizational
picketing is drastically limited for at least a year after a valid election. 29 USC §
158(b)(7)(B).
8, In ruling on objections to elections, the Board does not deal with unfair labor prac-
tices as such, but only with whether pre-election conduct destroyed the "laboratory condi-
tions" appropriate for a Board election. See generally Midland National Life Insurance Co.,
263 NLRB 127, 129 (1982). Nonetheless, a union objecting to an election because of an
employer's discharge of employees could easily file a related unfair labor practice charge.
Under NLRB v Gissel Packing Co., 395 US 575 (1969), a union would frequently have a
strong incentive to do so because of the bargaining order sanctioned by Gissel or because
the union wanted to establish the voting eligibility of discharged employee(s).
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other words, a union's loss of an election might lead to its filing
marginal charges, rather than marginal or unlawful employer con-
duct leading to the loss of an election.85 Accordingly, the causal
relationship usually postulated between union election failures and
unfair labor practices charges against employers might in some cir-
cumstances be inverted.
Under NLRB v Gissel Packing Co.,8 6 a key to the issuance of a
bargaining order in favor of a union despite its loss of an election
became "the commission of unfair labor practices that interfere[d]
with the election processes and tend[ed] to preclude the holding of
a fair election. '8 7 After Bernel Foam and Gissel, a union, even
though it had lost an election, could gain bargaining rights by
proving that it once had had a majority and that the employer had
committed "serious" unfair labor practices. 8 Discharges violative
85 Compare, for example, 98 Daily Labor Rep (BNA) A-5 (Oct 11, 1985) (union repre-
sentative threatened to file a charge if union lost the election, contending that employer had
threatened plant closure; employer rejoined that it had stated only that operations would
continue only so long as it could remain competitive). To be sure, in the 1960s and 1970s,
approximately 32 percent of all charges had merit (i.e., led to the issuance of a complaint).
See Flanagan, Labor Relations and the Litigation Explosion (cited in note 63); Weiler, 96
Harv L Rev at 1780 n 34 (cited in note 8). Overall percentages for a large class of charges do
not, of course, necessarily apply to a subset of that class. Nonetheless, there is no reason to
believe that the percentage of merit charges concerning dismissals in the organizational con-
text has declined with the increase in such charges: issues of credibility and motivation are
usually pivotal in the disposition of such charges, and the presence of such issues will usu-
ally lead to a complaint. See Andrea S. Chistensen, Major Surgery Not Required, in Morris,
ed, American Labor Policy 304, 397-98 (cited in note 59). Disputes over motive present risks
of error-both ways-for the NLRB and any other adjudicative system.
86 395 US 575 (1969).
87 Id at 594. Ultimately, the Supreme Court made it clear that an employer faced with
a bargaining demand, even though it was supported by a card-based majority, was not re-
quired either to recognize the union or to file an election petition. See Linden Lumber Div.,
Summer & Co. v NLRB, 419 US 301 (1974).
" Gissel, 395 US at 593-94, 614-15. In the mid-1960s, the number of bargaining orders
based on card majorities increased sharply. Cases in which the Board found card majorities
destroyed by unfair labor practices numbered 45 in 1962, 73 in 1963, 83 in 1964, 135 in 1965,
108 in 1966, 141 in 1967, and 139 in 1968. Memorandum from Robert Volger, NLRB Deputy
Executive Secretary, to John H. Fanning, NLRB Chairman 2 (Aug 29, 1980) ("Volger Mem-
orandum") (on file with U Chi L Rev). The Volger Memorandum divides these cases into
those not involving an election, as in Franks Bros. Co. v NLRB, 321 US 702 (1944), and
those in which an election was held but set aside, as in Bernel Foam. The 1947 Taft-Hartley
amendments to the Act had cast doubt on the Board's continued authority to order an
employer to bargain on the basis of a card majority. See Gissel, 395 US at 585-86. The
Board's mid-1960s decisions in Bernel Foam (1964), Gissel (1966), and related cases main-
tained that such authority had survived the Taft-Hartley amendments and thus may have
prompted additional cases of both the Franks Bros. and Bernel Foam type.
From 1962 through 1979, bargaining orders based on card majorities averaged 78 per
year or 1.9 percent of the number of certifications based on Board elections. See Volger
Memorandum at 1-2.
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of § 8(a)(3), although not absolutely necessary for a Gissel-type
bargaining order, are among the "hallmark violations" likely to
warrant such an order.8 Thus, Gissel and its progeny provided
still another strong incentive for filing of § 8(a)(3) charges by un-
ions losing Board elections. 0
Still another incentive for such filings arose from the retroac-
tive effect of Gissel-type bargaining orders. Because of such retro-
activity, the Board, in addition to issuing a bargaining order, would
award backpay to workers damaged by an employer's unilateral ac-
tion in, for example, reducing wages or fringe benefits without bar-
gaining with a union after rejecting its demand that it be recog-
nized as the employees' representative.9 1 In other words, after
issuing a retroactive bargaining order on the basis of Gissel, the
Board assesses the legality of, and remedies the employer's con-
duct, as if the employer had been under an obligation to bargain as
of the date to which the order is retroactive. Furthermore, when
employees respond to such a rejection with a recognition strike,
and the employer engages in contemporaneous and widespread un-
fair labor practices, the strike is treated as an unfair labor practice
strike.2 Hence, the strikers are entitled to reinstatement upon
making an unconditional offer to return to work. Finally, unfair
labor practice strikers engaging in misconduct are entitled to the
qualified protection provided by the Thayer doctrine.93 The pros-
pect of securing such protection against permanent replacement
and against discharge for otherwise unprotected conduct, coupled
89 See Larid Printing, Inc., 264 NLRB 369, 370 (1982); General Stencils, Inc., 195
NLRB 1109, 1112 (1972) (Chairman Miller dissenting).
" In 1965 (apparently in anticipation of the Supreme Court's 1969 Gissel decision)
there was a sharp increase in Gissel-type bargaining orders. See Howard Lesnick, Establish-
ment of Bargaining Rights Without an NLRB Election, 65 Mich L Rev 851, 851 n 1 (1967);
Comment, Refusal-to-Recognize Charges Under Section 8(a)(5) of the NLRA: Card Checks
and Employee Free Choice, 33 U Chi L Rev 359, 387-88 (1966).
91 See Trading Port, Inc., 219 NLRB 298 (1975) (unilateral elimination of jobs); Lapeer
Foundry, 289 NLRB No 126, 3 (Dec 20, 1988) (economically motivated layoffs without prior
bargaining).
92 Trading Port, 219 NLRB at 299; Road Sprinkler Fitters Local Union No. 669 v
NLRB, 681 F2d 11, 26 (DC Cir 1982). A strike for recognition is ab initio an economic strike.
See Road Sprinkler, 681 F2d at 20. The union's majority support, coupled with employer
misconduct serious enough to warrant a bargaining order, results in retroactivity for that
order to the time of the recognition demand. Hence, the employer's misconduct converts the
economic strike for recognition into an unfair labor practice strike, regardless of whether the
strike for recognition would have continued in the absence of employer misconduct. Id at
26-29.
" See discussion in note 74.
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with the potential for receiving backpay, plainly provides strong
incentives for filing § 8(a)(3) and 8(a)(5) charges.
Somewhat surprisingly, new incentives for filing unfair labor
practice charges against employers also resulted from the new re-
strictions on recognition and organizational picketing imposed on
unions by § 8(b)(7)(C), added to the NLRA in 1959.94 Such incen-
tives arose during the 1960s from the Board's reinterpretation of
that section95 and from the interplay between that reinterpretation
and the Board's long-established "blocking charge" rule. Under
that rule, the NLRB will generally abate a representation proceed-
ing and delay an election when a party has filed an unfair labor
practice charge alleging post-petition conduct serious enough to
have interfered with an election.9 6
After that reinterpretation, a union, by charging an employer
with an unfair labor practice, could strengthen its defense against
a charge that its picketing had had a recognitional objective. Fur-
thermore, the Board, under its "blocking-charge" rule, would not
hold an election until an unfair labor practice charge against an
employer had been disposed of unless the charging party executed
a "Request to Proceed." In the § 8(b)(7)(C) context, the Board's
application of that rule permitted a union to avoid the expedited
election that that section mandates if an election petition is filed
within thirty days after the beginning of recognitional picketing.
Thus, despite the filing of a timely election petition, the pendency
of a charge against the picketed employer would block the opera-
tion of the election machinery until the disposition of the charge.
If the Board deemed the charge frivolous and promptly dismissed
it, the election machinery would be activated without substantially
compromising the purpose of § 8(b)(7)(C). But a non-frivolous
charge against the employer, although ultimately held to be
groundless by the Board or a court, served as a license for recogni-
tional picketing during the typically protracted period before the
" Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 29 USC § 158(b)(7)
(1988).
" There is no need here for a detailed analysis of the changes in the Board's approach
that progressively narrowed the scope of § 8(b)(7) . See generally Bernard D. Meltzer, Or-
ganizational Picketing and the NLRB: Five on a Seesaw, 30 U Chi L Rev 78 (1962); Lee
Modjeska, Recognition Picketing Under the NLRA, 35 U Fla L Rev 633 (1983). It is enough
to say that § 8(b)(7) restricts picketing only when it has "recognition or organization" as an
object. Consequently, the Board, by a benign characterization of the objects of disputed
picketing, could free picketing unions from those restrictions. For an illustration of the lee-
ways in such characterization, see Local 259, UAW, 133 NLRB 1468 (1961).
" See NLRB Field Manual § 11730 (GPO, 1967); Carlson Furniture Industries Inc.,
157 NLRB 851, 852-53 (1966); McGuiness and Norris, How to Take a Case Before the
NLRB at 82 et seq (cited in note 43).
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Board (or a court) disposed of the case. Such a license undercut
the basic purpose of § 8(b)(7)(C), i.e., to shield employers and em-
ployees from extended recognitional picketing that might inflict
such severe economic losses on both parties as to result in recogni-
tion of the union without regard to its majority support. As a re-
sult of the Board's new approach to § 8(b)(7)(C), that section oper-
ated to provide new inducements to file unfair labor practice
charges against employers, including § 8(a)(3) charges, whether
frivolous or well-founded. 7 Our data do not, however, provide a
basis for estimating the extent to which those inducements in-
creased unfair labor practice charges against employers.
D. Section 8(a)(5) and Employer Resistance
Commentators have suggested that employer refusals to bar-
gain, like violations of § 8(a)(3), have contributed significantly to
deunionization. Professor Weiler, for example, highlighted what he
found to be a drastic decline in the rate at which certified unions
secure a first contract, from 86 percent of the certified bargaining
units in 1955 and 1960 to only 63 percent in 1980.98 Professor Wei-
ler reminded us that a worker views certification as hollow if it
fails to lead to a collective bargaining agreement.99 But § 8(a)(5)
charges or violations connected with such failures are, of course,
not fungible, and the changing incidence of such charges or viola-
tions does not reveal the character of the employer's disputed
conduct.
In order to get a better picture of such conduct, it is necessary
to identify its context and its connection with statutory procedures
and purposes. Such contextual analysis is especially needed when,
97 Before leaving § 8(a)(3), we note that in the 1960s a new basis for § 8(a)(3) violations
arose from the Board's recognition that a union's breach of the duty of fair representation
(DFR) violates the Act. The Board, breaking new ground, held that such a breach violates
§ 8(b)(1)(A) (making it an unfair labor practice for a union to restrain rights under § 7 of
the NLRA) and, in addition, the Board held that an employer may violate §§ 8(a)(1) and
8(a)(3) by granting a union's request incompatible with its DFR. See Miranda Fuel Co. Inc.,
140 NLRB 181 (1962), enforcement denied, 326 F2d 172 (2d Cir 1963). Such liability might
result even though an employer might be unaware of a union's improper purpose. See Bar-
ton Brands, Ltd. v NLRB, 529 F2d 793 (7th Cir 1976); Barton Brands II, 228 NLRB 889
(1977). According to the company's lawyer, this dispute was settled by the company's agree-
ing to $300,000 in backpay and reinstatement of 50 employees.
98 Weiler carefully states that the 1980 figure comes from a 1979-81 AFL-CIO study
that covered only units of at least 100 employees, but that other data for 1970 suggest an
even lower first contract success rate in smaller units. Weiler, 98 Harv L Rev at 351, 354 & n
7 (cited in note 10).
11 Id at 352, 354.
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as was the case from 1960 to 1980, changes in the economic envi-
ronment foreshadowed potential changes in the business of the
Board. A contextual breakdown of charges filed with the Board
will be presented in Part III. As background, it may be useful to
mention the importance of NLRB elections, the kinds of problems
they raise, and the administrative and judicial procedures for
resolving them.
1. The election framework.
A Board-conducted election is generally the means by which
unions achieve initial recognition from an employer. 100 In adminis-
tering its election machinery, the Board must make a variety of
determinations, including those relating to the timeliness of the
election petition, the appropriateness of the bargaining unit, the
compatibility of challenged pre-election conduct with the Board's
"laboratory-conditions" standard, the eligibility of voters, and the
handling of their ballots. 10
Such issues implicate concerns important to the parties and
the public. For example, the NLRB's decisions on "appropriate
units" may determine whether there will be any collective bargain-
ing in a plant or enterprise. Unions and employers have sought to
gerrymander accordingly. 0 2 Furthermore, such unit determina-
tions will affect the suitability of bargaining structures for accom-
modating the competing interests of various employee groups and
for achieving stable and orderly labor relations. 03 Finally, the
Board's policing of electioneering and the myriad details of elec-
tions implicates both the employees' self-determination interests
and the integrity (actual and apparent) of the Board's processes.
An employer, like a union, has a right to participate before the
Board in connection with the resolution of representation ques-
tions. But an employer (or a union) aggrieved by such a decision
has, in general, no right to direct judicial review of the disputed
decision. 0 4 If, however, the Board certifies a union despite an em-
100 We were unable to find time series data on "voluntary" recognitions. Compare Ross,
The Labor Law in Action at 12 (cited in note 30) (breaking down the basis for recognition
in a sample of NLRB cases that involved § 8(a)(5) charges).
101 See generally Miller, An Administrative Appraisal ch 2 (cited in note 48).
1 In order to curb such gerrymandering, Congress added § 8(c)(5) to the Act in 1947.
29 USC § 159(c)(5) (1988).
103 See E.R. Livernash, The Relation of Power to the Structure and Process of Collec-
tive Bargaining, 6 J L & Econ 10 (1963); Douglas L. Leslie, Labor Bargaining Units, 70 Va
L Rev 353 (1984).
10, See American Federation of Labor v NLRB, 308 US 401 (1940).
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ployer's objection to the unit or to the conduct of the election, the
employer can get judicial review of the Board's representation de-
terminations by refusing to bargain with the certified union. The
employer's refusal would precipitate a § 8(a)(5) charge and, ulti-
mately, a Board bargaining order in the resultant unfair labor
practice proceeding. An employer is entitled to judicial review of
such orders and the representation decisions on which the validity
of both the Board's certification and its bargaining order de-
pends. 10 5 Thus, an employer's refusal to honor a Board certification
may be prompted by a legitimate desire to get a court to determine
whether disputed Board election determinations are compatible
with the Act or with the NLRB's established standards.
An employer may, however, have another motivation for con-
testing an election before the Board and then in court: it may
merely be playing for delay. 10 A strategy of delay is sometimes
appealing to anti-union employers because it may undermine the
union's support and reduce the likelihood that the union will win a
second election or achieve a first contract. 0 7 In addition, even if a
court rejects all the employer's objections to a certification and up-
holds the Board's remedial order, such orders typically are not on-
erous. Hence, the possibility of remedial action by the Board would
not appear to be a forbidding prospect for employers bent on
delay.10 8
Other costs associated with such a strategy may, however, be
substantial. These may include: strikes for better terms and condi-
tions; monetary liability, if the employer's unilateral action lowers
employee benefits; reputational damage to the employer; lower em-
ployee morale; slowdowns that will receive protection under the
Thayer doctrine; strikes that would qualify as unfair labor practice
105 Id at 406; NLRB v Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 US 111, 114 n 6 (1944).
108 Unfair labor practice charges that turn on the validity of the Board's representation
determinations typically are resolved much more quickly by the Board than other charges.
The reason is that the Board has already determined the underlying questions during the
representation proceeding and generally refuses to relitigate them in the unfair labor prac-
tice proceedings. See generally Magnesium Casting Co. v NLRB, 401 US 137 (1971). None-
theless, by seeking judicial review, an employer may, of course, substantially delay the ful-
fillment of its bargaining obligation.
107 See Myron Roomkin and Richard Block, Case Processing Time and the Outcome of
Representation Elections: Some Empirical Evidence, 1981 U Ill L Rev 75. Other studies
have, however, questioned both the effect of such delays on, and their significance for, elec-
tion outcomes. See Lawler, Unionization and Deunionization at 213-14 (cited in note 63).
108 The weakness of the NLRB's conventional remedies for § 8(a)(5) violations is a fa-
miliar theme. See, for example, Frank W. McCulloch, Past, Present and Future Remedies
under Section 8(a)(5) of the NLRA, 19 Lab L J 131 (1968). For the Board's fluctuations on
remedial issues, see Meltzer and Henderson, Labor Law at 850-51 (cited in note 63).
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strikes, with resultant limitations on the employer's retention of
replacements; and substantial litigation expenses. Such potential
costs supplement, and may be more burdensome than, those im-
posed by a general Board order to the employer to bargain with a
certified union.
2. The economic context and bargaining positions.
An additional source of first-contract failures is the bargaining
impasse. Some impasses reflect a firm's exercise of its statutory
right to engage in "hard bargaining"'1 9 and to shape its bargaining
positions so as to reflect competitive pressures. Other impasses re-
sult from "sham" bargaining" ° in which an employer purports to
honor a certification and to bargain while in fact it is seeking to
avert, rather than to reach, an agreement.
The distinction between hard, economically motivated bar-
gaining (permitted) and sham bargaining (proscribed) is manifestly
murky."' That distinction reflects the basic dilemma that has
plagued the NLRB from its creation: how to reconcile the tension
between the "good faith bargaining" required by the NLRA and
the private ordering of employment terms that the Act was not to
disturb."'
Beginning in the late 1960s and the early 1970s, the economic
environment created strong incentives for employers to engage in
conduct that might lead to charges of § 8(a)(5) violations. That
period included the oil shocks of the 1970s, stiffer foreign competi-
tion, a recession, numerous plant closings, and mass layoffs." 3
Such an environment might well have increased hard bargaining in
first contract negotiations (as well as increased challenges to certi-
fications). Similarly, that environment may have led to an increase
in charges that such bargaining had been an unlawful attempt to
avoid any agreement rather than a lawful effort to contain costs in
response to market forces. During the 1980s, moreover, employees
log See NLRB v Tomco Communications, 567 F2d 871, 884 (9th Cir 1978).
110 See J.P. Stevens & Co., Inc. v NLRB, 623 F2d 322, 325-26 (4th Cir 1980); Borg-
Warner Controls, 198 NLRB 726 (1972); Gorman, Basic Text on Labor Law at 484-89 (cited
in note 73).
"I See sources cited in note 110.
"' See H.K. Porter Co., Inc. v NLRB, 397 US 99, 103-09 (1970).
"I See R. McKenzie, Plant Closings: Public or Private Choices? 22-24 (Cato Institute,
1982), noting the connection between significant job losses in manufacturing and the closing
of manufacturing plants. Because changes in manufacturing employment reflect both expan-
sion and contraction of existing plants, opening of new plants, and closing of old plants, it is
difficult to sort out the differing influence of those processes. Id at 40.
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appeared to be less reluctant to cross picket lines and to work as
replacements for strikers. We do not have data regarding the fre-
quency with which employers, over time, have resorted to replace-
ments." 4 But there seems to be a widespread impression that their
use has increased, in part because it has been easier to hire
replacements and, in part, because more employers consider that
expedient an appropriate and feasible countermeasure to a
strike.1 5 Such impressions, whether they reflect reality, might well
contribute to tougher bargaining positions by employers, which in
turn might frustrate a first agreement and precipitate strikes and
the hiring of replacements. Resort to replacements after a bargain-
ing impasse and a first contract failure generates strong motives
for filing unfair labor practice charges. Although it is not easy to
disentangle economic motives from anti-union sentiments as such,
the changing economic environment might well have been the key
factor in tougher employer bargaining positions and resultant first
contract failures.
3. Plant closings, mergers, and acquisitions.
The economic environment beginning with the late 1960s and
the concomitant restructurings and adjustments highlighted a
range of questions relating to established, as well as to new, bar-
gaining relationships. These questions included: the employer's
duty to bargain with an incumbent union over a decision to close a
plant" 6 or over other decisions reducing jobs in a bargaining unit,
such as decisions to subcontract" 7 all or part of unit work; the ob-
ligation of acquiring or "successor" employers to bargain with the
114 President Reagan's unusually tough response to the air traffic controllers' strike of
1981 included the use of strike replacements and the firing of the strikers in accordance
with the federal statute criminalizing strikes by federal employees. See 5 USC § 7311 (1978);
18 USC § 1918 (1988). Some observers urged that that strike and its aftermath weakened
workers' sense of solidarity and the entire labor movement; others disagree. See Bernard D.
Meltzer and Cass R. Sunstein, Public Employee Strikes, Executive Discretion, and the Air
Traffic Controllers, 50 U Chi L Rev 731, 794-95 n 304 (1983).
115 See Statement of Franklin Frazier, Director of Education and Employment Issues,
Human Resources Division of the General Accounting Office before the Subcommittee on
Labor, Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources, 5-9 (June 6, 1990). Because of a
lack of time series data, that study was, however, unable to document any increase in
replacements. Id at 3.
"' See generally First National Maintenance Corp. v NLRB, 452 US 666 (1981);
Michael C. Harper, Leveling the Road from Borg-Warner to First National Maintenance:
The Scope of Mandatory Bargaining, 68 Va L Rev 1447 (1982); Comment, Mandatory Bar-
gaining and the Disposition of Closed Plants, 95 Harv L Rev 1896 (1982).
17 See Fibreboard Paper Products v NLRB, 379 US 203 (1964); Westinghouse Electric
Corp., 150 NLRB 1574 (1965).
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predecessor's labor union or to honor the latter's collective agree-
ment;11 and the propriety of unilateral employer changes in work-
ing conditions during the term of an agreement or during the hia-
tus between agreements." 9
There is no need here to develop these issues. It is enough to
suggest that an increase in § 8(a)(5) charges arising from them was
not surprising, given the surrounding legal uncertainties, the po-
tential for securing substantial backpay awards, the bleak alterna-
tives for employees displaced from high-paying jobs in industries
such as autos and steel, and the ideological cast to disputes arising
from the clash between employers' claims to "managerial or en-
trepreneurial prerogatives" and workers' claims of "property
rights" in jobs.
The distinction between § 8(a)(5) charges arising from estab-
lished relationships and those arising from bargaining that does
not lead to a "first contract" warrants a caveat. We do not mean to
imply that apparently economically-motivated closings are neces-
sarily free from any motive to curb union demands in other units
or to escape unionization. Nonetheless, such closings generally are
essentially different from employer tactics, such as sham bargain-
ing, that are designed to deprive a union of the substance of its
newly won certification. Plant closures typically involve more im-
mediately significant economic stakes for a firm and its employees
than does sham bargaining during post-certification negotiations or
the firing of a few union adherents during an organizational cam-
paign. Furthermore, plant closures raising issues under the NLRA
usually involve potentially greater backpay liability than the kinds
of illegality just described.1 20 Finally, the NLRA cannot provide
11s See generally NLRB v Burns Int'l Security Services, Inc., 406 US 272 (1972); Fall
River Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v NLRB, 482 US 27 (1987); Herbert R. Northrup and
Philip A. Miscimarra, Government Protection of Employees Involved in Mergers and Ac-
quisitions ch 2 (Pennsylvania, 1989).
"9 The legality of unilateral action also arises during first contract negotiations, but the
regulation in that context is much less intricate than in established contractual relation-
ships. See 29 USC § 158(d); also compare Gorman, Basic Text on Labor Law ch 20 at § 13
(cited in note 73) with id, ch 20 at § 14.
110 When an employer's decision to close a plant without bargaining over that decision
has been held to violate § 8(a)(5), backpay has been ordered from the date of the decision
until the parties have bargained to agreement on the relevant issues, a bona fide impasse
has been reached, or until bargaining has, in effect, been waived by the union. See Produc-
tion Molded Plastics, 227 NLRB 776, 778 (1977), enf'd, 606 F2d 451 (6th Cir 1979). Where,
however, the violation results from a failure to bargain over the effects of a "permissive"
closing, backpay begins to run from the Board's (rather than the employer's) decision. See
J-B Enterprises, Inc., 237 NLRB 383, 387-88 (1978). The distinction between these two
related situations goes back at least to the Board's decision in Transmarine Navigation
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significant protection against plant closures prompted by loss of
markets.
Transfers of unionized operations, like plant closures, are also
potential sources of substantial backpay awards. Such transfers in-
creased from 1960 through 1968, one of the great waves of merger
and acquisitions in our history.12 1 Moreover, between 1955 and
1980, there were significant doctrinal changes regarding the impact
of § 8(a)(5) on the acquisition of a unionized business-so-called
"successorship" problems. 122  These developments may have
spawned additional § 8(a)(5) charges in the context of established
bargaining relationships. Thus, an increase in charges arising from
mergers and acquisitions, as well as plant closings, would not be
evidence of greater employer resistance to newly certified unions
but might well reflect changes in underlying economic forces.
III. THE CONTEXT OF NLRB ADJUDICATIONS AND SETTLEMENTS
Sections 8(a)(3) and 8(a)(5) are broad and apply to a wide va-
riety of industrial relations contexts. Thus, classification of a case
under one of those sections tells us little about the relationship
between that case and a union's loss of an election or a winning
union's inability to secure a first contract. Unfortunately, the
NLRB organizes its statistics under these uninformative sectional
rubrics.
In order to get a better sense of the business of the Board, we
classified Board adjudications, as well as certain settlements, under
five categories indicative of the context from which charges
Corporation, 170 NLRB 389 (1968).
121 See David J. Ravenscraft and F.M. Scherer, Mergers, Sell-Ofis, and Economic Effi-
ciency 21 (Brookings Institution, 1987). Forty-four percent of acquisitions of manufacturing
and mineral firms in the 27 years between 1950-77 occurred during 1966-70. Id at 22. An
extensive body of caselaw in this area has emerged. See Northrup and Miscimarra, Govern-
ment Protection of Employees at ch 4 (cited in note 118).
122 Compare Chemrock Corp., 151 NLRB 1074, 1078-80 (1965) (successor required to
bargain with union before reducing the employees' wages or terminating their employment)
with NLRB v Burns Int'l Securities Services, Inc., 406 US 272, 281-91 (1972) (rejecting
Board's view that would have bound a "successor" to its predecessor's unexpired collective
bargaining agreement).
Successorship cases also involved potentially large backpay awards when an employer
made unilateral changes in employment terms before discharging its duty to bargain. The
Supreme Court, however, reduced the risks of such awards by upholding in general a non-
discriminatory successor's right unilaterally to fix the terms on which it would employ the
predecessor's workers. See Burns Int'l Security Services, 406 US 272 (affirming denial of
enforcement of NLRB make-whole order in favor of employees damaged by unilateral
changes in agreement).
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arose. 12  Those categories encompass allegations of: (1) unlawful
employer interference with an employee's rights when no union is
present; (2) unlawful employer support of, or negotiation with, a
union that had never demonstrated majority support in the unit;
(3) encroachment on protected activity during organizational
drives either before or after the filing of an election petition;
(4) unlawful employer refusal to bargain or discrimination after
the Board certified a union but prior to its securing a collective
bargaining agreement; and (5) employer illegalities during estab-
lished bargaining relationships regardless of whether the term of
the collective bargaining agreement had expired at the time of the
alleged violation. 124 The following Section sets forth our findings
regarding the industrial relations context of charges adjudicated by
the Board or settled by the parties. Although we will occasionally
relate our findings to various contentions concerning the rogue em-
ployer thesis, our reference to those contentions is not intended as
an endorsement of them. We will reserve for Part IV an assess-
ment of the significance of our contextual findings for that thesis.
A. The Contexts of Board Adjudications
In both 1955 and 1980, a significant percentage of Board adju-
dications addressed allegations of the kind highlighted by propo-
nents of the rogue employer thesis. As Table 5 shows, approxi-
mately 25 percent of all Board adjudications involved allegations
of discriminatory discharges during organizational drives.2  In ad-
dition, 12 percent of all 1955 adjudications and 18 percent of all
1980 adjudications addressed alleged employer refusals to bargain
in good faith after certification but prior to a first contract. Fur-
1' For our contextual analysis of ULP charges, we drew separate random samples of
Board decisions from 1955 and 1980. The 1955 sample consisted of 202 of the 304 Board
decisions; the 1980 sample consisted of 202 of the 985 Board decisions. See 15 NLRB An-
nual Report 5 (1955) and 45 NLRB Annual Report 13 (1980). We chose those years for two
reasons. First, 1980 marked a high point in the number of charges filed with the Board and
has been the focus of literature on employer lawlessness. See Freeman and Medoff, What
Do Unions Do? at 232-33 (cited in note 39); Weiler, 96 Harv L Rev at 1780-81 (cited in note
8). Second, in 1955, union density in the United States was comparatively high, while the
number of NLRB adjudications was relatively low. For a more detailed description of those
samples and an elaboration of our industrial relations categories, see the Statistical Appen-
dix, Section II, pp 1010-11.
12 A collective bargaining agreement may continue to operate even after its expiration
date. See Nolde Brothers, Inc. v Local 358 Bakery & Confectionery Workers Union, 430 US
243 (1977); Goya Foods, 238 NLRB 1465, 1467 (1978).
" Some cases, because they involved multiple and varied allegations, fell into more
than one of our charge-categories.
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thermore, the Board adjudicated more than three times as many
charges in 1980 as in 1955.126 Consequently, our findings imply
that there was a corresponding increase in the number of adjudica-
tions involving charges of discriminatory discharges during organi-
zational campaigns, as well as charges of refusal to bargain in good
faith after certification but prior to a first contract. Similarly, to
the extent that our sample of Board adjudications is representative
of the Board's total docket, our results are consistent with the the-
sis that an increase in such violations of the Act is associated with
a decline in union successes both in NLRB elections and in secur-
ing first contracts.
Nonetheless, our analysis confirmed our presupposition that
charges of discrimination arise from a variety of industrial rela-
tions contexts. Of adjudications addressing such charges, 58 per-
cent in 1955 and 39 percent in 1980 involved alleged violations
arising from nonorganizational contexts.127 A significant percentage
of these allegations (45 percent in 1955 and 31 percent in 1980)
arose within the context of established bargaining relationships.
Furthermore, discrimination in such contexts potentially involves
many reinstatees and large backpay awards.128 Thus, the substan-
tial percentage of charges of "discrimination" arising from estab-
lished bargaining relationships undermines the contention that 90
percent of § 8(a)(3) charges and violations arose from the organiza-
tional context. Our findings also are incompatible with the widely
held belief that 1 in 20 union supporters were victimized by a dis-
criminatory discharge during organizational campaigns.
There are two noteworthy differdnces between the § 8(a)(3)
adjudications in 1955 and 1980. First, as Table 5 shows, the 1955
sample involved a larger percentage of allegedly union-instigated
discharges in established bargaining contexts (ten percent of the
1955 adjudications compared to only one percent in 1980). Second,
a much larger percentage of 1980 adjudications under § 8(a)(3) ad-
dressed allegations of employer discrimination in the organiza-
tional context that consisted of actions short of discharge (only five
percent in 1955, compared to 25 percent in 1980).
The rogue employer thesis postulates not only that employers
have increasingly resorted to discriminatory discharges during or-
128 See note 123.
121 See Statistical Appendix, Table A, for the percentages of all Board adjudications, of
§ 8(a)(3) adjudications, and of § 8(a)(5) adjudications, respectively, that address alleged vio-
lations in the industrial relations contexts described above.
128 See notes 73-81 and accompanying text.
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TABLE 5
CHARGES AGAINST EMPLOYERS IN NLRB ADJUDICATIONS
[Percentage of Adjudications of Various Allegations]
Type of Allegation 1955 1980
Nonunion (or Nonadversary Union) Context:
Discharge for Concerted Activity 3% 6%
Employer-Assisted Union 4 0
Organizational Context:
Discharge 25 24
Other Discrimination 2 13
Campaign Misconduct 23 32
Extensive Misconduct-Gissel Order 1 6
Post-election/Prior to Agreement:
Discharge 3 2
Misconduct: Threats, etc. 0 2
Unilateral Change in Terms 2 1
Failure to Bargain with Newly
Certified Union 12 18
Established Contract:
Discharge 11 10
Union-Instigated Discharge 10 1
Failure to Reinstate Strikers 2 5
Other Discrimination 6 5
Misconduct: Threats, etc. 3 6
Unilateral Change in Contract Terms 5 8
Failure to Provide Information 4 4
Other Failure to Bargain in Good Faith 4 9
Notes: The statistics in this table are based on random samples of 204 NLRB-adjudicated
cases in 1955 and 202 such cases in 1980. The "context" of the cases refers to the relation-
ship between the employer, the employees, and the union when the violation allegedly oc-
curred. "Nonunion" refers to charges that arose when there was no formal collective bar-
gaining agreement in effect nor any evidence of union organizing activity. "Organizational"
refers to alleged violations that occurred prior to or after the filing of an election petition,
during the period between filing of the petition and the election, and after a campaign had
been formally terminated. "Post-election/prior to agreement" refers to alleged violations
that occurred after a union election victory had been certified by the NLRB but prior to a
first contract. "Established contract" refers to alleged violations that occurred in relation-
ships that had negotiated successfully at least one collective bargaining agreement. Sources:
15 NLRB Annual Report 5 (1955) and 45 NLRB Annual Report 13 (1980).
ganizational campaigns but also that the vast majority of employ-
ees offered reinstatement have been discharged during such cam-
paigns. In order to assess that contention, we examined the context
of adjudications that led to reinstatement offers.129 We found the
following. First, in both years, employers had unlawfully dis-
129 The Board issued such orders in approximately one-third of our samples of 1955 and
1980 adjudications.
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charged one or more employees during organizational drives in 50
percent of the relevant adjudications. Second, a significant per-
centage of the Board's reinstatement orders arose from employer
violations in the context of established bargaining contexts (30
percent of the 1955 reinstatement orders and 33 percent of the
1980 orders). 130 Plainly, these findings strengthen our earlier
doubts that 90 percent of § 8(a)(3) violations arose from the or-
ganizational context.
Our contextual analysis of § 8(a)(5) adjudications once again
underscores the varied industrial relations contexts that generate
charges of refusal to bargain in good faith. Of the adjudications
addressing such allegations, 58 percent in both 1955 and in 1980
did not arise in the period after certification but prior to a first
contract. Plainly, the rise in § 8(a)(5) adjudications resulted in part
from an increase in charges remote from the post-certification,
first-contract context. Nonetheless, 42 percent of our 1955 and
1980 § 8(a)(5) adjudications addressed alleged violations after cer-
tification but prior to a first contract.
Furthermore, turning to Board bargaining orders, we found
that 52 percent of 1980 orders remedied employer violations that
occurred in that context. The magnitude of these percentages
leaves open the possibility that a significant number of employers
may be refusing to bargain in good faith with newly certified un-
ions in the hope that union support will be eroded by a strategy of
delay.
B. The Contexts of Settled Cases
Our Chicago sample, which is obviously small and parochial, is
a problematic basis for extrapolations. Nonetheless, our findings
imply that Board-adjudicated charges are not representative of the
Board's total docket. A larger percentage of settled cases than
Board adjudications involved § 8(a)(5) charges arising from estab-
lished bargaining relationships.13' That fact suggests that extrapo-
lations based on Board-adjudicated charges may overstate the sig-
130 In 16 percent of the 1980 reinstatement orders and 5 percent of such 1955 orders,
the Board remedied employer discharges for "concerted activity" in situations in which a
union did not have, and did not seem to be seeking, representative status.
" Table 6 indicates that 60 percent of the settled cases, compared to 46 percent of
Board adjudications (from the 1980 sample), involved § 8(a)(5) charges. Furthermore, 62
percent of the settled cases, compared with 35 percent of the 1980 Board adjudications,
arose out of established bargaining relationships.
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TABLE 6
SETTLEMENTS FROM THE NLRB
REGIONAL OFFICE IN CHICAGO
% of
Frequency of § 8(a)(3) and § 8(a)(5) Charges: Settlements
Settlements resolving § 8(a)(3) charges 45
Settlements resolving § 8(a)(5) charges 60
Context of Charges:
Nonunion Context: Concerted Activity 6
Organizational Context 21
Post Election/Prior to Agreement 9
Established Contract 62
Most Common Allegations:
Unilateral Changes in Employment Terms 22
Discharges in Organizational Settings 18
Discrimination Other than Discharge or
Bypassing Union in Established Relationship 13
Discharge in Established Relationship 8
Involvement in Decertification Drive 8
Source: Random sample of 53 cases voluntarily settled by the parties in 1985 and 1986 on
file in the NLRB's Regional Office in Chicago. For a description of the industrial relations
contexts of the charges see Table 5 and the Statistical Appendix, Table A.
nificance of employer lawlessness in organizational or post-certifi-
cation/pre-first contract contexts.
The most significant findings bearing on the importance of
such lawlessness are as follows. First, as the last panel of Table 6
shows, employers were charged with discriminatory discharges dur-
ing an organizational campaign in 18 percent of settled cases. This
percentage is somewhat less than the corresponding percentage ap-
plicable to 1980 Board adjudications (24 percent). Second, as the
middle panel of Table 6 shows, nine percent of the settled cases
involved allegations arising from occurrences after certification but
before a first contract. That percentage is also smaller than the
corresponding percentage (23 percent) of such cases in our samples
of Board adjudications. Consequently, inferences drawn from our
sample of Board adjudications are not likely to understate, and
may overstate, the significance of alleged discriminatory discharges
during organizational drives or refusals to bargain in good faith
prior to a first contract.
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IV. REASSESSING THE ROLE OF EMPLOYER LAWLESSNESS
A. Discharges During Organizational Drives
In trying to determine the incidence of discriminatory dis-
charges in the organizational context, we face at least three quite
distinctive populations of unfair labor practice allegations: first, all
charges of such discrimination; second, such charges that have sur-
vived the General Counsel's filtering process and have led to the
issuance of a complaint (charges with merit); and finally, com-
plaints that have led to a Board finding of an unlawful discharge
and a remedial order calling for reinstatement and backpay. 132 Ob-
viously, the universe of actual discriminatory discharges extends
far beyond the last subset of cases. Indeed, many allegedly unlaw-
ful employee discharges during organizational drives are effectively
concealed or settled.13 3
Settlements of charges of such firings sometimes call for the
employer to reinstate one or more employees. On the one hand,
such settlements presumably involve a greater likelihood of an ac-
tual violation of § 8(a)(3) than do cases dismissed or withdrawn.
On the other hand, some charges of unlawful discrimination are
presumably settled by employers even though no such discrimina-
tion occurred. Such settlements might be prompted by a desire to
avoid legal expenses, reputational damage, or industrial unrest. Be-
cause of such offsetting factors, estimates of the frequency of dis-
charges in the organizational context are subject to error in both
directions.
In order to make such an estimate, we drew on our finding
that 50 percent of the Board's reinstatement orders were based on
employer violations during organizational drives. That percentage,
applied to all settled and adjudicated cases in which employees
were offered reinstatement, indicates that in 1980, discriminatory
132 Other subsets of ULP cases are those involving judicial affirmance or reversal of
Board determinations. We have not dealt with those populations, in part, because the sam-
ples are too small to be representative of the total population of discharges remedied by
backpay awards and reinstatement offers.
133 The settlement of, and the issuance of a complaint in, a case may not be signifi-
cantly different indicators of probable violations. Management lawyers report that they will
not settle unless the General Counsel's office has indicated that a complaint is likely to issue
or unless their own investigation indicates a strong likelihood of such action. Employers'
lawyers sometimes know more about the charges than does the General Counsel, and they
will encourage an early settlement when their information shows that a violation probably
occurred or at least that a complaint is likely to issue. Consequently, pre-complaint settle-
ments may frequently be as probative of a violation as post-complaint settlements.
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discharges may well have occurred in 20 percent of election
campaigns. 1 3
To estimate the number of discharged union supporters per
pro-union voter in NLRB elections, we need to estimate the aver-
age number of employees covered by a reinstatement offer in cases
arising from the organizational context. Our samples of Board ad-
judications in 1955 and 1980 do not permit reliable determinations
of that number. 13 5 But a basis for that determination is provided
by a plausible GAO study of § 8(a)(3) cases that arose in 1979.
That study found that employers discharged an average of 2.2 em-
ployees per complaint alleging discriminatory discharges during or-
ganizational campaigns. 3 6
Using the GAO's study and our sample of Board adjudica-
tions, we estimated the number of union voters per discharged
union supporter in 1980. For that year, we first estimated that
3,199 employees had been offered reinstatement because of unlaw-
18' This 1980 percentage was derived by multiplying the number of cases in which one
or more employees were offered reinstatement (2,851) by the fraction of Board reinstate-
ment orders (0.51) in our sample of Board adjudications arising out of employer discharges
during organizational campaigns. See 45 NLRB Annual Report 23, Table 4 (1980). That
product (1,454 cases) was then divided by 7,296, the number of collective bargaining elec-
tions in 1980, to arrive at 0.20. See 45 NLRB Annual Report 270-72, Table 13 (1980). That
result was not significantly altered when we substituted the number of 1980 elections for the
1979 number, in order to account for the time lag between the occurrence of the alleged
violation and the closing date of a case. One difficulty with these calculations is that the
numerator includes discharges during all phases of an organizational campaign, whereas the
denominator measures the number of organizational campaigns by the number of elections.
Because not all organizing drives lead to a petition, let alone an election, the number of
organizational campaigns is greater than the number of NLRB elections. Hence, the 20 per-
cent figure derived from the number of elections rather than the number of organizational
campaigns may well overstate the frequency of discriminatory discharges aimed at averting
unionization.
"" NLRB Annual Reports do not identify the context of alleged or actual violations.
Beginning in 1964, the NLRB has reported annually the number of adjudicated or settled
cases leading to reinstatement. Such reinstatement offers averaged 3.1 persons per case be-
tween 1964 and 1988. Moreover, during that period, there has not been any tendency for
that ratio to rise or fall. See 29-53 NLRB Annual Reports Table 4 (1964-88). We naturally
would prefer an estimate of the ratio of persons offered reinstatements per case (in which
such offers are made) in only those cases that arose from alleged violations during organiza-
tional drives.
16 The GAO studied "400 section 8(a)(3) cases which the NLRB considered as having
merit" from 11 of the Board's then 33 offices (i.e., the Regional Director had issued a com-
plaint in those cases during 1979). The GAO's figure of 2.2 employees covered by each com-
plaint was derived by dividing the number of employees allegedly discharged during organi-
zational drives (394) by the number of complaints alleging such firings (176). See GAO
Study at 4-5, Appendix I (cited in note 51). We assume that the 2.2 figure for cases involv-
ing complaints applies to cases involving Board findings of violations or settlements by the
parties.
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ful discharges during organizational drives.3 7 Second, we used that
number as the divisor into the 199,900 pro-union votes in NLRB
elections in 1980.138 Hence, in 1980, approximately 1 in 63 union
supporters, in contrast to Weiler's 1 in 20 ratio, may have been
unlawfully discharged during organizational drives.139 Even the 1
in 63 ratio manifestly represents a serious denial of statutory rights
to individual employees and a potentially serious impediment to
effective union organization.
The 1 in 20 ratio for unlawful discharges during organizational
campaigns apparently rested on three erroneous and interrelated
assumptions: first, that most discharge allegations arose in organi-
zational settings; second, that only an insignificant fraction of such
cases arose during established bargaining relationships; and third,
that each § 8(a)(3) violation arising from the organizational con-
text is likely to result in substantially the same number of rein-
statees as would result from § 8(a)(3) violations arising from an
established bargaining relationship. As we indicated in Part 111, 04
our sample of Board adjudications suggests that the first two of
those assumptions are erroneous. Fully one-third of the Board's re-
instatement orders redressed violations arising out of established
bargaining relationships. True, the fraction of such cases is less
than the fraction arising from the organizational context. But, con-
trary to the third assumption, § 8(a)(3) violations arising from es-
tablished bargaining settings are likely to involve significantly
larger numbers of reinstatees and significantly larger backpay
awards than violations in other settings. 4 1
1' This figure is derived by multiplying the number of 1980 adjudicated and settled
cases involving reinstatement offers (2,851) by the estimated fraction of such cases that arise
in organizational settings (one-half) and by multiplying that product by the number of rein-
statees per case (2.2). The number of 1980 cases is taken from 45 NLRB Annual Report 248,
Table 4 (1980).
138 45 NLRB Annual Report 280, Table 15B (1980).
139 Focusing on the number of individuals covered by reinstatement offers, as distin-
guished from backpay awards, is appropriate for the following reasons. First, if there is
strong evidence of a discriminatory discharge, the Board will generally reject a settlement
unless it includes a reinstatement offer. Second, violations of § 8(a)(5), such as improper
unilateral action or refusal to bargain in connection with plant closings, may generate
backpay awards despite the absence of discriminatory discharge. See notes 116-20 and ac-
companying text. Third, some discrimination falls short of discharge. See text following note
128. Weiler's estimate does not expressly take account of the foregoing considerations or of
the possibility that some settlements calling for backpay may result not from violations but
from an employer's wish to avoid litigation expenses, industrial unrest, or unfavorable pub-
licity. See Weiler, 96 Harv L Rev at 1780-81 (cited in note 8).
140 See notes 125-30 and accompanying text.
"' See note 81 and text following note 73.
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The well-known 20:1 ratio has been invoked in support of the
thesis that unlawful discharges during organizational campaigns
have become more pervasive. To test that thesis and to compare
the implications of our method with Weiler's, we used both meth-
ods in estimating the numbers of union supporters discharged per
union voter as well as the percentage of elections connected with
employer conduct that led to reinstatement offers for the period
from 1964 to 1988.142 As Table 7 shows, both procedures indicate
that the number of discriminatory discharges during organizational
drives increased significantly after the mid-seventies.143 However,
as the first column of Table 7 shows, the estimates based on our
contextual data regarding alleged employer unfair labor practices
indicate that such discharges are much less common than Profes-
sor Weiler suggested. That difference reflects our finding that a
substantial fraction of discriminatory discharges arose outside of
the organizational context.14 4
Estimates based both on our methodology and on Professor
Weiler's also indicate a sharp increase in the ratio of discharged
union supporters to pro-union voters since the 1960s. However, as
the second column of Table 7 shows, the estimates based on our
data indicate that the ratio of such discharges is much lower than
Professor Weiler suggests. Similarly, our estimates indicate a sig-
' ' We chose this period because the NLRB statistics required for the calculations did
not become available until 1964. 29 NLRB Annual Report 155 (1964).
"' An employer could implement a strategy of coercion by discharging only one person
in a bargaining unit of, let us assume, no more than 75 employees. If bargaining units de-
clined from, for example, 75 to 40 employees, that strategy would still require at least one
discharge in a unit; the ratio of discharges to union supporters or votes would rise. Because
Board elections have tended to involve progressively smaller units, an increase in that ratio
would not be surprising, if one accepted the premise that employers generally view a dis-
criminatory discharge as an effective anti-union measure. Furthermore, smaller firms, be-
cause they may well have more casual disciplinary procedures, would find it harder to prove
the legitimacy of discharges during an organizational campaign that were alleged to be dis-
criminatory. Any discharge of a union supporter during such a campaign-whatever the rea-
son-becomes suspect and a potential § 8(a)(3) violation. Board disposition of charges of
such violations usually turns on an assessment of conflicting testimony and a determination
of the employer's motive.
An employer may avoid an election if its resistance, legal and illegal, (or employee op-
position to a union) denies a union the "substantial support" (usually 30 percent of the
bargaining unit) necessary for the direction of a Board election. Our data do not permit us
to estimate the extent to which employer illegalities forestall Board elections.
144 The percentage of cases leading to reinstatement offers that arose outside the or-
ganizational context was higher in our sample of Board adjudications (49 percent) than in
the GAO's sample of § 8(a)(3) complaints (40 percent). That difference may reflect sampling
error or differences between the populations of cases surveyed. See GAO Study at 5, Appen-
dix I (cited in note 51).
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TABLE 7
DISCHARGES DURING ORGANIZATIONAL DRIVES
[Annual Average During Period]
Pro-Union Percentage Percentage
Voter per of Elections of Elections Elections
Discriminatory Discharged with Unlawful Won by Held by
Years Discharges Union Supporters Discharge Unions NLRB
Panel A: Estimates Based on Context of ULP Charges and Remedies
1964-69 1,371 1/209 8 59 7,698
1970-74 1,342 1/196 7 54 8,298
1975-79 1,942 1/110 11 49 7,884
1980-84 2,812 1/57 20 46 5,049
1985-88 2,483 1/36 32 48 3,559
Panel B: Estimates Based on Professor Weiler's Methodology
1964-69 4,539 1/63 27 59 7,698
1970-74 4,317 1/61 24 54 8,298
1975-79 4,817 1/44 29 49 7,884
1980-84 6,844 1/19 62 46 5,049
1985-88 5,647 1/16 72 48 3,559
Notes: In Panel A, "Discriminatory Discharges" are estimated by multiplying the num-
ber of settled or Board-adjudicated cases leading to a reinstatement offer by 0.5, the fraction
of such cases estimated from our samples of 1955 and 1980 Board adjudications that arise
from alleged violations of the Act during organizational drives by 2.2, the estimated number
of persons offered reinstatement per case. "Pro-Union Voter per Discharged Union Support-
ers" is estimated by dividing the number of discriminatory discharges (in column 1) by the
number of voters supporting the union in NLRB elections. "Percentage of Elections with
Unlawful Discharge" is estimated by dividing the estimated number of cases involving a
discriminatory discharge during an organizational drive by the number of collective bargain-
ing ("RC" or "RM") elections. Finally, the percentage of collective bargaining elections won
by unions and the number of collective bargaining elections held by the NLRB are
presented in columns 4 and 5, respectively. In Panel B, the figures in column 1 report the
average number of employees offered reinstatement annually. The figures in column 2 are
derived from the number of discriminatory discharges (in column 1) divided by the number
of union voters in NLRB elections. The figures in column 3 are derived from the number of
cases involving a discriminatory discharge (column 1 divided by 2.2 persons per case) di-
vided by the number of elections. The figures in columns 4 and 5 are derived as in Panel A.
Sources: 29-53 NLRB Annual Reports Tables 4 and 13 (1964-88); GAO Study (cited in note
51); and the authors' calculations based on 1955 and 1980 Board adjudications.
nificant increase, during the 1980s, in the percentage of elections
connected with discriminatory discharges that led to a reinstate-
ment offer. Once again, there is, however, a significant difference
between our estimates and Professor Weiler's. As the third column
of Table 7 shows, our estimate indicates that during the early
1980s, when union victory rates were low, such unlawful discharges
occurred in connection with 20 percent of NLRB elections. In con-
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trast, Weiler's methodology implies that such discharges occurred
in connection with 63 percent of all election campaigns. 15
Even though estimates based on our sample of Board adjudi-
cations indicate an increase in the incidence of discriminatory dis-
charges, the correlation between the frequency of such discharges
and declining union victory rates in NLRB elections is not stable.
As the fourth column of Table 7 shows, the percentage of elections
won by unions declined steadily from the late 1960s but appears to
have stabilized during the mid-70s. By contrast, estimates of dis-
criminatory discharges during organizational campaigns have con-
tinued to rise. During the 1980s, the fraction of election campaigns
where at least one employee may have been unlawfully discharged
is much higher than in previous years. The rate of union election
victories in the 1980s, however, is not significantly lower than the
rate in the late 1970s, when there were apparently fewer discharge
cases per election.
Similarly, the linkage between the number of reinstatees and
the union success rate in a given period is placed in question by
the experience soon after the NLRA's passage. At that time, there
was a concurrence of a large number of reinstatement offers to em-
ployees and a high union success rate in NLRB elections. 146 That
earlier experience, together with the data in Table 7, underscores
doubts about the causal link between discriminatory discharges
during election campaigns and union success rates.
"I The latter percentage follows from Professor Weiler's assertion that one in twenty
supporters was discharged during NLRB election campaigns and the GAO's finding that an
average of 2.2 employees were covered by complaints that the employer had discriminatorily
discharged an employee(s) during organizational campaigns. To arrive at that percentage,
we divided Weiler's estimate of the number of employees discharged during organizational
drives in 1980 (10,833) by the estimated number of discharges per case arising in that set-
ting (2.2). See note 136. We then divided that quotient, 4,560 cases, by the number of collec-
tive bargaining elections in 1980, yielding 0.63, the proportion of elections involving a dis-
criminatory discharge. See 45 NLRB Annual Reports 249, Table 4, and 264, Table 11A
(1980).
"4' See Miller, An Administrative Appraisal at 163, Table 17 (cited in note 48), show-
ing the approximate number of employees offered reinstatment in the years in question.
That number (and the union success rate in collective bargaining elections) was 59,398 (77
percent) in 1939; 37,514 (77 percent) in 1940; 47,902 (94 percent) in 1941; 40,388 (86 per-
cent) in 1942; and 8,361 (86 percent) in 1943. See 4-8 NLRB Annual Reports (1939-43).
Granted, those early years under the Act were extraordinary: the NLRA gave a ringing en-
dorsement to unionization as a counterpoise to employer combination and as an anti-de-
pression measure. Employers challenged the Act as unconstitutional; the Great Depression
inspired or deepened anti-capitalist attitudes; the CIO organized the mass production indus-
tries; and the AFL and CIO divided on a number of issues. See Harry A. Millis and Emily
Clark Brown, From the Wagner Act to Taft-Hartley 34 (Chicago, 1950). Despite its ex-
traordinary backdrop, that early experience casts further doubt on a causal relationship be-
tween reinstatement offers and the outcomes of NLRB elections.
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More importantly, other NLRB data suggest that even the es-
timates in Table 7 may overstate the frequency of discriminatory
discharges during organizational drives. Those data concern the
frequency of unfair labor practice settlements, union objections to
election conduct, and recent studies of the incidence of substantive
§ 8(a)(3) allegations in connection with NLRB elections. The sig-
nificance of those data is developed below.
NLRB statistics on the disposition of ULP cases show that
most charges leading to reinstatement offers have been settled not
only without a Board adjudication but also without great delay. In
1980, of the cases leading to a reinstatement offer, 72 percent were
settled informally by the parties before the issuance of a complaint
against the employer. 147 In 1980, the NLRB reported that the me-
dian time between the filing of a charge and a settlement or adjust-
ment was only 33 days.1 48 Furthermore, settlements including a re-
instatement offer have comprised an increasing percentage of
reinstatement cases.149 Consequently, the number of instances of
intentional discharges as part of a strategy of delay has arguably
been quite small, involving perhaps three percent of organizational
campaigns.1 50
Another indication that discriminatory discharges during or-
ganizational drives may be even less frequent than suggested by
Table 7 appears in the NLRB's statistics on union objections to
election conduct. Those statistics show that in the 1970s and
1980s, compared to the 1960s, there was a modest decrease in the
number of objections unions filed concerning lost elections.' 51 But
147 See 45 NLRB Annual Report 248, Table 4 (1980); Edward B. Miller, Professor
Weilers's Funny Figures (unpublished speech) (on file with U Chi L Rev).
1"8 See Comparison of Median Time (Days) Elapsed in Processing Cases (cited in note
49). The median time before a complaint is issued or a charge is settled may, of course, be
longer for a § 8(a)(3) allegation. Id.
14' The percentage of cases leading to reinstatement offers resulting from settlements,
as distinguished from Board orders, rose from 69 percent in the late 1960s' to 78 percent in
the 1980s. 29-53 NLRB Annual Reports Table 4 (1964-88).
150 One way of estimating the number of organizational campaigns involving intentional
discharges of union supporters designed to exploit procedural delays is to assume that such
violations are eventually adjudicated by the Board. Employers engaging in a strategy of
discharge and delay presumably would be much less likely to settle. In fiscal year 1980, the
Board adjudicated 985 employer unfair labor practice cases. (A "case" may involve more
than one allegation.) The Board ordered employees reinstated in 422 of those cases. See 45
NLRB Annual Report 248, Table 4 (1980). Our sample of Board adjudications indicates
that roughly one-half of those orders remedied employer violations during organizational
drives. See notes 129-30 and accompanying text. These figures suggest that the Board or-
dered employees reinstated as a result of discriminatory discharges during 211 (422 times
0.50) or approximately 3 percent of organizational campaigns.
I"' Between 1964 and 1969 (the NLRB first reported such figures in 1964), unions filed
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that decrease would have been unlikely if during the last 20-25
years there had been a surge of employer discrimination designed
to avert union election victories. Had employers stepped up such
discrimination after an election petition had been filed, 52 union
objections to lost elections would presumably have increased.
Hence, the decrease in union objections works against the conten-
tion that employers have increasingly sought to frustrate organiza-
tional drives through tactics destructive of either laboratory condi-
tions or statutory rights.
Further evidence that our estimates may overstate the inci-
dence of unlawful discharges during organizational campaigns ap-
pears in recent studies of NLRB elections by the GAO and by
Richard Freeman and Morris Kleiner. The GAO study showed that
unions or employees had alleged that employers had violated
§ 8(a)(3) in connection with 121 of 368 NLRB elections in 1979.153
But the charges connected with 74 of those elections were dis-
missed or withdrawn, presumably because they lacked merit. 54
Thus, § 8(a)(3) charges with merit were filed in connection with 47,
or 13 percent, of those elections. Furthermore, many of those
§ 8(a)(3) charges alleged employer discrimination short of dis-
charge. 55 Consequently, the GAO study implies that the discrimi-
natory discharges occur in less than the 20 percent of election cam-
paigns derived from our sample of Board adjudications. 56
Freeman and Kleiner's finding points in the same direction.
Their sample consisted of charges filed in connection with elections
held by the NLRB's Boston and Kansas City Regional Offices be-
tween 1979 and 1985. 57 Those data show that 13 percent of 202
NLRB elections involved union allegations of § 8(a)(3) viola-
tions.158 One-third of those allegations were, however, either dis-
objections to 27 percent of elections lost, compared to 17 percent of elections lost during the
1970s and 1980s. See 29-53 NLRB Annual Reports Tables 11-liD (1964-88).
I" A losing party may not challenge an election on the basis of discharges that occurred
before the filing of an election petition. See The Ideal Electric and Manufacturing Com-
pany, 134 NLRB 1275, 1278 (1961).
153 GAO Study at 9-10, Appendix I (cited in note 51).
'B' Id.
See GAO Study at 4-5, Appendix I (cited in note 51).
'" See note 134.
52 We are grateful to Morris Kleiner for providing us with the data used in his study
with Richard Freeman. See Richard B. Freeman and Morris M. Kleiner, The Impact of New
Unionization on Wages and Working Conditions, 8 J Labor Econ S8 (1990); Richard B.
Freeman and Morris M. Kleiner, Employer Behavior in the Face of Union Organizing
Drives, 43 Industrial & Labor Rel Rev 351 (1990).
158 Freeman and Kleiner surveyed "firms that had elections with over 20 employees in
the potential bargaining unit and obtained on-site interviews with management in 202"
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missed by the Regional Director or withdrawn by the union.'59 Ac-
cordingly, unions may have filed a substantial § 8(a)(3) allegation
in less than nine percent of those elections. Moreover, those data
do not indicate whether the alleged discrimination involved a dis-
charge or arose before or after certification. Hence, an even smaller
percentage of those cases may have involved allegations of unlaw-
ful discharges during organizational drives. Although their samples
have obvious limitations, the studies by Freeman and Kleiner and
by the GAO both suggest that discriminatory discharges during
union organizing drives are substantially less frequent than the 63
percent figure that we imputed to Weiler on the basis of our un-
derstanding of his methodology. Indeed, those studies indicate that
our corresponding 20 percent estimate derived from our sample of
Board adjudications may also be excessive.
B. Refusal to Bargain with a Victorious Union
As indicated above, an employer may block a union from con-
verting an election victory into a first contract by filing pre-certifi-
cation objections to the election with the NLRB. If the Board
overrules such objections, an employer may challenge the subse-
quent certification and decline to recognize the union, or may pur-
port to recognize it but engage in "sham" bargaining. 6 0 Commen-
tators have suggested that employers have increasingly resorted to
such expedients in order to avert or delay the bargaining that usu-
ally follows a union election victory.' 6 ' That suggestion is, however,
not free from difficulty.
To be sure, it gains some support from the increase in the per-
centage of elections challenged by employers. 62 But, as already in-
firms. Unions won 39 percent of those elections. The authors obtained information from 196
firms on whether the union had filed an unfair labor practice charge. Unions filed § 8(a)(3)
charges in 12 percent of elections lost and 16 percent of elections won. However, it cannot
be determined from the survey data whether those charges were filed before or after NLRB
certification. See Freeman and Kleiner, 43 Industrial & Labor Rel Rev at 354-55 (cited in
note 157).
The remaining cases were settled or adjudicated.
100 See notes 105-10 and accompanying text.
... See Weiler, 98 Harv L Rev at 357 (cited in note 10). See also William N. Cooke,
Union Organizing and Public Policy: Failure to Secure First Contracts 94-98 (W.E. Upjohn
Institute for Employment Research, 1985) (reporting on the relationship between unfair la-
bor practice allegations and the chances that newly certified unions would secure a first
contract in Indiana (NLRB Region 25) during the late 1970s).
..2 NLRB statistics indicate that employers objected to union or Board conduct in a
larger percentage of elections during the 1980s than in the 1960s. Between 1964 and 1969,
employers filed objections regarding 7 percent of elections won by unions, compared to em-
ployers' objections regarding 10 percent of such elections during the 1970s, and 13 percent
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dicated, 1 3 the reasons for that increase are far from clear. Further-
more, other evidence works against the contention that employers
increasingly seek to exploit the statutory election procedures in or-
der to frustrate the achievement of a first contract. Thus, in re-
lated contexts, employers have not exploited opportunities for de-
lay. Instead, they have consistently agreed to either consent or
stipulated elections, with the bargaining unit and other issues re-
solved by "mutual consent." Employers have been willing to avoid
the delay of a hearing on, and initial determination of, such mat-
ters by a regional director.1 64
A consent or stipulated election does not bar an objection to
an election based on campaign misconduct. When such employer
objections are unsuccessful, they may be followed by an employer
challenge to a NLRB certification of a union. Such a course of con-
duct obstructs first contracts for a substantial period. (In a given
case, sham bargaining may also cause such obstruction, but, ac-
cording to our data, does not operate in a significant percentage of
cases. Only two decisions in each sample of 1955 and 1980 Board
adjudications involved allegations of employer surface bargaining
in the period following certification but prior to a first contract.) In
short, the key tactic for obstructing first contracts would appear to
be employer challenges to certifications and the delays accompany-
ing the resulting ULP proceedings.
There are, however, difficulties in determining whether there
has been a significant increase in first contract failures resulting
from employer refusals to honor certifications. To our knowledge,
pertinent time-series evidence is not available. To be sure, existing
estimates of first-contract failure cover 1957-1962, 1970, and 1979-
1985. But those estimates are based on samples derived from sub-
stantially different populations.6 5 Consequently, the differential
during the 1980s. See 29-53 NLRB Annual Reports Table llC (1964-88). See also Cooke,
Union Organizing and Public Policy at 55, Table 2-5 (cited in note 161).
163 See text following note 105.
' Consent and stipulated elections (as distinguished from Regional Director- or
Board-adjudicated elections) accounted for 74 percent of NLRB elections in the 1950s; 77
percent in the 1960s; 81 percent in the 1970s; and 76 percent in the 1980s. See 15-29 NLRB
Annual Reports Table 11 (1950-63); 30-53 NLRB Annual Reports Table 11A (1964-88).
According to the NLRB's lexicon, in both "consent" and "stipulated" elections, the par-
ties agree by "mutual consent" to hold an election in a specified unit. In a consent election,
final disposition of election challenges or objections is made by the Regional Director,
whereas in a stipulated election it is made by the Board. In a "Regional Director" or "Board
directed" election, an election is ordered in a specified unit only after a pre-election hearing.
See 45 NLRB Annual Report 233-34 (1980).
1e5 See Statistical Appendix, Section III, pp 1011-14 for a summary of these estimates
and a description of the samples used in each study.
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union success rates may be a function of differences in the popula-
tions being compared, as distinguished from differences in em-
ployer recalcitrance. It is, accordingly, difficult to determine
whether unions have been substantially less successful in con-
verting certification into a first contract in recent years than in the
1950s.
It is also difficult to determine from Board adjudications the
rates at which employers have refused to honor NLRB certifica-
tions. Extrapolations of such rates from Board adjudications gener-
ally overstate the frequency with which such charges arise follow-
ing certification. For instance, our sample of 1980 Board
adjudications shows that approximately 40 percent of § 8(a)(5)
cases involved charges that employers had refused to honor NLRB
certifications. But it would be anomalous to apply that percentage
to the total number of § 8(a)(5) charges disposed of by the agency
in 1980. That application would suggest that in 1980 there were
substantially more charges alleging that employers had refused to
honor a certification than there were certifications. 6' The explana-
tion for that anomaly appears to lie in the fact that charges under
§ 8(a)(5) arising from employer challenges to certification are much
more likely than other § 8(a)(5) charges to lead to a complaint and
to be upheld by the Board.
Our data, although they do not clearly establish that employer
challenges are dilatory ploys, are consistent with that conclusion.
The Board, in the unfair labor practice proceedings precipitated by
such challenges, almost always reaffirms its representation deter-
minations and upholds the certification. 167 Furthermore, courts in
76 percent of our sample enforced the Board's resultant bargaining
orders.6 " There is, accordingly, only a small chance that challenges
"' In 1980, there were 9,866 cases involving allegations of § 8(a)(5) violations. If 40
percent of them reflected employers' refusal to honor certifications, 3,946 of such cases
would have arisen from that context. By contrast, in 1980, unions won only 3,498 collective
bargaining elections. See 45 NLRB Annual Report 243, Table 2, and 280, Table 15B (1980).
There is, of course, a difficulty in comparing or linking adjudications of unfair labor prac-
tices and certifications of union election victories in the same year. Adjudications in a given
year may well deal with conduct occurring in prior years. This difficulty, however, is miti-
gated by the lack of significant year-to-year variations in the number of certifications in the
period involved and by the relatively short delay between an employer's refusal to honor a
certification and a resultant remedial Board order. In our 1980 sample, the Board adjudi-
cated such cases with a summary judgment within an average of six months after filing of
the charge.
1"' In our sample of 1980 adjudications, the Board found that employers charged with
violating § 8(a)(5) had violated the Act in all but one of the 37 cases involving employer
challenges to the Board's representation determinations.
68 Courts of appeals enforced the Board's order in 16 of the 21 cases in our sample,
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to a certification will be upheld. Given their substantial legal and
other costs, including potential employee unrest and reputational
damage, such challenges may well be motivated by a desire either
to delay bargaining or ultimately to subvert or to avert it by erod-
ing the union's majority support. Nonetheless, the delay motive
does not seem to be operative as frequently as some commentators
have suggested.16 9 Thus our contextual classifications indicate that
in 1980, the Board adjudicated 185 charges alleging that an em-
ployer had refused to honor an NLRB certification. 170 Those cases,
however, constituted only five percent of the 3,441 certifications in
that year. 17 1
C. Linking Increased Allegations to Increased Violations
A key premise underlying the rogue employer thesis and as-
sessments of its significance is that the rising number of alleged
violations reflects an increase in actual violations. 172 But the rising
tide of litigation throughout our society during the last forty years
highlights questions about the relationship between an increase in
the number of alleged and actual violations of a law. Several de-
tails of the litigation explosion are of special interest here. First,
beginning with the 1960s, the number of unfair labor practice
charges against unions has risen nearly as fast as charges against
employers. 173 Second, developments under the NLRA generate un-
certainty and instability, which breed litigation. Third, Title VII
cases involving charges of employment discrimination on grounds
remanded three cases to the NLRB, and denied enforcement in only two cases.
,e' See Weiler, 98 Harv L Rev at 356 (cited in note 10).
170 This estimate rests on the following data. First, there were 37 cases in our sample of
1980 adjudications where the employers had challenged representation determinations un-
derlying an NLRB certification. Second, our random sample consisted of 20 percent of 1980
Board adjudications. Accordingly, we estimated that the Board adjudicated 185 (37 x 5)
cases where the employer had refused to honor NLRB certification.
"7 That percentage, although small, may encompass situations where, even after the
employer's challenges are rejected by the Board or courts, the union finds that employee
turnover and the passage of time have eroded its support in the unit despite its election
victory.
172 Weiler, 98 Harv L Rev at 356-57 (cited in note 10); Weiler, 96 Harv L Rev at 1778-
81 (cited in note 8).
173 Between 1950 and 1988, unfair labor practice charges against unions increased from
1,236 to 9,111 (730 percent). That growth rate was faster than the rate of growth in unfair
labor practice charges filed against employers. Since the mid 1960s the growth in union
unfair labor practice charges has averaged 3.4 percent per year compared with 3.8 percent
for the growth in employer unfair labor practice charges. 15-53 NLRB Annual Reports Ta-
ble 2 (1950-88).
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of race, sex, etc., increased dramatically in the early 1980s.114 Fi-
nally, the caseload of the entire federal court system has also
surged, only in small part because of labor law or employment liti-
gation.11 5 Treating all these forms of litigation as proof of greater
lawlessness implies that unions are increasingly violating the
NLRA, employers are increasingly discriminating against minori-
ties, and society generally has become less law abiding. All these
conclusions may be true, but their truth cannot be established
merely by showing that charges of illegality have soared.
There are, moreover, good reasons for doubting each of these
conclusions. Competing and plausible explanations have been of-
fered for the surge in litigation in the United States.176 These ex-
planations suggest that individuals are more assertive of their for-
mal rights; workers are better informed about their "rights" and
the legal process; new rights have been created by legislative and
common law development; and incentives to resort to the legal ma-
chinery have grown stronger, at least for employees adversely af-
fected by changes in the labor market. These considerations again
suggest that the link between increased allegations of employer
lawlessness and the declining fortunes of unions is problematic.
Plainly, a more definitive appraisal of the rogue employer thesis
will require consideration of the increases in allegations of illegal-
ity in other contexts, the relationship of such increases to the inci-
dence of actual violations, and the basis, if any, for distinguishing
increases in alleged employer violations of the NLRA from in-
creases in charges of illegalities in other contexts.
I" Between 1980 and 1984, the number of employment discrimination suits filed in
federal district courts increased by more than 60 percent, after declining slightly between
1976 and 1980. That surge resulted entirely from an increase in individual, as distinguished
from class action, suits. EEOC data indicate these suits reflected an increase in the number
of individuals complaining of unlawful discharge. Furthermore, the rise in age discrimina-
tion complaints did not account for that increase. Between 1980 and 1984, the percentage of
such complaints in the EEOC's docket fluctuated around an average of 18.4 percent. See
John J. Donohue and Peter Siegelman, The Changing Nature of Employment Discrimina-
tion Litigation Figures 3, 6, and Table 5 (unpublished working paper, Northwestern Univer-
sity, Apr 1989) (on file with U Chi L Rev).
"I' See Paul M. Bator, What is Wrong with the Supreme Court?, 51 U Pitt L Rev 673,
676-77 (1990).
178 See Richard A. Posner, Federal Courts: Crisis and Reform 62-67 (Harvard, 1985);
Marc Gaanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don't Know (and
Think We Know) about Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L Rev
4 (1983); Michele M. Hoyman and Lamont E. Stallworth, Who Files Suits and Why: An
Empirical Portrait of the Litigious Worker, 1981 U Ill L Rev 115.
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V. IMPROVEMENTS IN NLRB STATISTICS
We have illustrated how the limitations of the Board's statis-
tics complicate efforts to assess the significance of allegedly in-
creased employer lawlessness and other competing or complemen-
tary influences on American deunionization. Furthermore, these
limitations presumably contribute to a common failure of commen-
tators to take account of the varied contexts from which § 8(a)(3)
and § 8(a)(5) charges arise. In particular, commentators have
sometimes paid inadequate attention to the number and percent-
age of such charges arising in contexts far removed from either the
organizational campaigns or the post-certification pre-first contract
setting. We have also shown that an important reason for these
statistical limitations is that the Board generally publishes its data
according to the sections of the NLRA implicated by a case, with-
out indicating its industrial relations context. One disadvantage of
this method of organization, immediately pertinent here, is its fail-
ure to provide easily accessible data regarding either the percent-
age of alleged and actual § 8(a)(3) violations in a given year that
arose in an organizational context or the percentage of alleged
§ 8(a)(5) violations that arose prior to a first contract.
We believe that there .are measures that would alleviate the
foregoing deficiencies without engendering either great delays in
case processing or great expense. In considering such measures, it
is useful to distinguish between cases adjudicated by the Board
and those involving charges that are settled, dismissed, or with-
drawn. In adjudicated unfair labor practice cases, administrative
law judges (ALJs) could accompany their opinions with classifica-
tions of the industrial relations context out of which a case arose,
as well as the section or sections of the Act involved. Table 8 con-
tains tentative suggestions for contextual rubrics for a classifica-
tion framework to be used by all ALJs. The Board and its staff
undoubtedly could refine, supplement, and generally improve those
rubrics. 17 7 In any event, after the Board reviewed an ALJ's opin-
"I A quarter of a century ago, Philip Ross castigated the Board for collecting and re-
porting masses of information of doubtful usefulness, while failing to collect data about "the
sources" (presumably the context) of its caseload. See Ross, The Labor Law in Action at 29
(cited in note 30). The Board still does not identify the industrial relations context of its
docket, except for the relatively few unfair labor practice cases in which it authorizes actions
for injunctions under § 10(j) proceedings. See Quarterly Report of the General Counsel,
November 21, 1989, Section 10(j) Authorizations at 1-3.
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ion, a Board member's legal assistant could make appropriate
changes in classification, in light of the Board's decision. 7 s
TABLE 8
CLASSIFICATION OF UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE CHARGES
[Industrial Relations Context of Allegations]
• Concerted activity, no union organizing drive or contract
El Discharge alleged
" Negotiating with a union lacking majority status
* Organizing drives before and after petition
El Discharge alleged
El Other discrimination
" Post-certification/prior to first contract
El Refusal to bargain: challenge representation
determination
El Other section 8(a)(5)
El Discharge alleged
El Strike or lockout
" Established bargaining relationship: existing or expired
contracts
El Discharge alleged
El Other discrimination
El Strike or lockout
El § 8(a)(5)
Unfair labor practice cases that are settled present special dif-
ficulties for a classification system. Scatter-gun allegations are fre-
quent in such cases. Furthermore, the parties generally reach a set-
tlement before the General Counsel has had an opportunity to
scrutinize the allegations and issue a complaint, or before Board
adjudication refines and resolves the issues raised by a complaint.
Consequently, classification of settled cases would be problematic
because it would be based on allegations that frequently had not
been filtered by the General Counsel or the Board.179 Despite these
178 Our proposed classification system may be too broad and may need narrower catego-
ries. Furthermore, as under any classification system, subjective appraisals would not be
completely eliminated, especially if more than one section of the Act were involved. But our
experience with the rubrics of Table 8-even without finer tuning-suggests that, by clarify-
ing the contexts of unfair labor practice charges, they would increase understanding of the
Board's business.
"I The Board might be able to use a classification scheme sufficiently simple to enable
charging parties to self-report the industrial relations context in which the alleged violation
occurred. The classification scheme used by the charging parties could be included on The
Charge Against Employer Form, NLRB-501 (GPO, 1984). Although information from the
charging party, unreviewed by an NLRB official, would have a greater likelihood of error,
such information would be an improvement over the existing situation. Edward B. Miller,
former NLRB Chairman, has suggested to the authors that the regional offices, upon issuing
a complaint, could code each case for its industrial relations context. That procedure might
avoid the need for further case classification by the ALJs or the Board's legal assistants.
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difficulties, even a rough and imperfect classification system would
be an improvement over the current system.
A contextually-oriented classification system for both settled
and adjudicated cases would increase understanding of the con-
texts out of which unfair labor practices-actual and al-
leged-arise. Indeed, a contextual classification system would be
helpful in the development and appraisal of reforms, actual or pro-
posed, through legislation, rulemaking, or doctrinal revisions by
the Board. To be sure, such proposed "reforms" raise issues of
value, ideology, and judgment of consequences, the resolution of
which may not be affected by an improved data base. But such
issues could be narrowed, illuminated, or resolved more effectively
in light of better data on the matrix of violations, actual and al-
leged, of the NLRA.180
It would be natural for the Board to be reluctant to impose
additional burdens on its already-hard pressed case-processing
staff in order to make its reports more useful to students of the
Board's business. Although outsiders are notorious for understat-
ing the burdens that their proposals would impose on others, we
are doubtful that the adoption of the foregoing proposals would
substantially increase the workload of that staff.181 Furthermore,
gaining a better understanding of the sources of the Board's busi-
ness would appear to be important enough to justify the added
burden. Indeed, a more complete understanding would be useful
both to the Board as it reviews and refines its own approaches and
to students of the Act as they appraise the Board's work and eval-
uate recommended statutory changes. 182
"I With respect to representation cases, the regional offices could devise a similar pro-
cedure in order to classify such cases. Again, if the Board reviewed a case, a legal assistant
could also review the classification used by the regional office.
"" The proposed classification scheme might, of course, indirectly increase the burden
on the case-processing staff if that staff were cut in order to fund the hiring of additional
statisticians. This scenario seems unlikely, however.
182 In order to get a better sense of the burdens and benefits, without incurring great
costs, the Board could develop a pilot project that would cover cases arising from conduct
that occurred in a geographically and industrially diversified group of its regional offices.
The Bureau of Labor Statistics might be of help in shaping and evaluating a pilot project
along the lines sketched out above. There would appear to be special justification for such
collaboration because the Department of Labor (where the BLS is located) is responsible for
promoting the welfare of workers, and the Secretary of Labor has broad statutory investiga-
tive authority. See 29 USC §§ 551, 560 (1988).
1991] 1005
The University of Chicago Law Review
CONCLUSION
The decline of American unions is the result of the complex
interaction of a cluster of factors: the economic environment, legal
and illegal opposition of employers, the attitudes of employees,
and the legal framework. Consequently, it is difficult to assess the
independent contribution made to deunionization by each of these
factors. Nonetheless, we have concluded that methodological flaws
have led some commentators to overestimate the incidence and
significance of employer lawlessness. Specifically, the contention
that increased employer lawlessness has been a major factor in
American deunionization lacks adequate support. Moreover, there
is no basis for concluding that the importance of such lawlessness
for deunionization comes close to that of structural changes in the
U.S. economy. To be sure, structural changes may have increased
employers' fears that the increased costs associated with unioniza-
tion would threaten their firm's profitability or indeed the firm's
existence. Such fears may in turn have increased employer opposi-
tion-legal and illegal-to unionization. Even so, both legal and
empirical considerations indicate that some studies have over-
stated the significance of employer lawlessness.
We have considered estimates involving the NLRA's prohibi-
tion against discrimination and its requirement of good faith bar-
gaining. In connection with the prohibition against "discrimina-
tion," our contextual analysis of Board adjudications and
settlements demonstrates the considerable significance of employer
"discrimination" outside the organizational context. Neglect of this
consideration has contributed to excessively high estimates of the
incidence of discriminatory discharges during organizational cam-
paigns. Thus, for 1980, we estimated that roughly 1 in 60 union
supporters were discharged during such campaigns, in contrast to
the 1:20 ratio reported by Professor Weiler and ritualistically re-
peated by others. Even our lower estimate of the incidence of dis-
criminatory discharges represents a potentially significant disre-
gard by employers of the Act's statutory protections. Our analysis
indicates that such illicit activity has been increasing from the
1960s to the present. Yet we find that the increase does not corre-
late with the largest decline in union victory rates in NLRB elec-
tions in that time frame. Furthermore, even our estimate appears
to overstate both the incidence and the rate of increase in discrimi-
natory discharges in the organizational context. A lower estimate is
suggested by the Board's statistics on the ratio of elections to peti-
tions, the high and rising fraction of informal settlements leading
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to reinstatement offers, and the stable ratio of union objections to
elections lost.
When we turn to the duty to bargain, our data suggest that
employers may be denying recognition to certified unions in order
to erode union support or, at least, to delay bargaining. Such frus-
tration of the statutory purpose has, of course, disfigured labor re-
lations, from the earliest days of the Act. But serious difficulties
surround the contention that there has been a significant increase
in such illicit behavior, an increase that has in turn resulted in a
substantially smaller percentage of certifications that lead to a first
contract. First, the comparisons on which that contention rests
have involved samples drawn from substantially different popula-
tions. Second, our contextual analysis has indicated that employers
challenged only five percent of NLRB certifications. That small
percentage suggests that employers' refusal to recognize newly cer-
tified unions could not have accounted for much deunionization.
Moreover, some of those challenges may have been a good faith
effort to vindicate legal rights by the only means that the law
provides.
Efforts to assess the significance of discriminatory discharges
during organizational drives and refusals to bargain after certifica-
tion are obstructed by the failure of the Board's statistics to iden-
tify the labor relations contexts out of which actual and alleged
violations arise. To be sure, such identification would take staff
time and call for changes in established procedures. But a contex-
tually-based reporting system promises to increase our under-
standing of experience under the NLRA, without imposing sub-
stantial burdens on the Board's staff.
We should not, however, overlook the limitations of such data
in connection with efforts to determine the relationship between
union organizational successes and an array of variables that might
significantly influence election outcomes. Such variables include, as
we have seen, legal and illegal employer opposition; the nature of
unions' organizational campaigns; the unions' reputation; the
workers' training, skills, and general attitudes toward unions; the
workers' perception of their alternative employment opportunities;
and the plants' competitiveness. Such a focus on plants is neces-
sary for reliable judgments on whether, for example, apparently
discriminatory discharges during organizational campaigns, chilled,
served as a rallying point for, or had no substantial impact on or-
ganization. Such plant-based studies would be costly and time-con-
suming and would sometimes generate controversy about method-
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ology rather than consensus about causalities. 15 3 Accordingly, we
do not suggest that proposals or legislation of new policies would
or should wait for such studies. But such periodic and careful ef-
forts to assess at the plant level the factors influencing union orga-
nizational successes and failures would be useful to those seeking
to understand the way the Act works, its connection with the in-
creasingly hard times experienced by unions in the private sector,
and the probable contribution of legislative proposals aimed at
protecting the rights of employees to choose or reject a union.
103 See studies by Getman, Goldberg et al (cited in note 61) and by Dickens (cited in
note 62).
1008 [58:953
Hard Times for Unions
Statistical Appendix
I. UNION MEMBERSHIP AND UNION DENSITIES
Available statistics on union membership and union density in
the United States are not comparable across widely separated
years. Recent statistics, for example, appear in the Current Popu-
lation Survey (CPS), a monthly survey of 56,000 U.S. households.
That survey reports whether respondents are employed union
members and whether their compensation is governed by a collec-
tive bargaining agreement.1 In contrast, statistics collected prior to
1973 are derived from union membership lists. Although those lists
include employed members, they sometimes also include unem-
ployed and retired members. Troy and Sheflin observed that their
estimates of the number of union members based on union mem-
bership lists were more than 5 percent higher than estimates for
the same year derived from the CPS.2 Therefore, in order to make
Troy and Sheflin's estimates of union membership in the 1950s
more nearly comparable with recent CPS based estimates, we mul-
tiplied the 1950s figure by 0.95. That adjustment is obviously
crude but adequate for present purposes. The resulting estimates
suggest a significant decline in private sector U.S. union member-
ship: from 14.8 million in 1953 to 10.5 million in 1989.
Our estimate of the decline in union density also required an
adjustment to existing statistics. The 1953 figure was derived from
Troy and Sheflin's 1953 estimates for the nonagricultural economy:
private and public sector (32.5 percent) and public sector (11.6
percent).' Combining those estimates with the fact that the public
sector employed 12 percent of the 1953 nonagricultural work
force,4 we calculated that union density in the private nonagricul-
tural sector as 35 percent for that year.
' Tabulations of union membership and union density from the CPS are summarized
annually in the February issue of Current Wage Developments (published by the U.S. De-
partment of Labor). Statistics covering the 1970s are also summarized in Edward L. Kok-
kelenberg and Donna R. Sockell, Union Membership in the United States, 1973-1981, 38
Industrial & Labor Rel Rev 497 (1985).
' See Troy and Sheflin, U.S. Union Sourcebook at 3-2, 3-3 (cited in main text at note
1).
, Id at 3-14, Table 3.62.
" See Economic Report of The President 1990 342-43, Table C-43 (cited in main text at
note 31).
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II. SAMPLES OF BOARD ADJUDICATIONS AND OF CHICAGO REGIONAL
OFFICE SETTLEMENTS
The analysis of Board adjudications in Part III draws on ran-
dom samples of Board decisions in contested employer unfair labor
practice cases for 1955 and 1980.1 Each sample consisted of 202
decisions. On request, the authors will provide the citations.
We classified each decision (as well as the settled cases from
the Chicago regional office) according to the industrial relations
context in which the alleged violation(s) occurred. For the pur-
poses of this paper, we used five contexts: (1) concerted activity
outside the union context; (2) bargaining with a union lacking ma-
jority status; (3) organizational campaigns; (4) post certification
but prior to a first contract; and (5) established bargaining rela-
tionships. The organizational context included the following
settings:
-campaign in progress: period prior to a petition
-campaign in progress: between petition and election
-campaign in progress: period uncertain
-after a formal termination of a campaign
The established bargaining context included the following settings:
-established bargaining relationship: uncertain duration
-established bargaining relationship: 5 years or less
-established bargaining relationship: 5 years or more
-decertification campaign in progress
-bargaining with a successor employer
-representation status established by pre-hire agreement
Thus, panel 1 of Table A presents the industrial relations con-
text of all Board adjudications; panel 2 presents the contexts of
adjudications involving § 8(a)(3) charges; and panel 3 presents the
contexts of adjudications involving § 8(a)(5) charges.
One obvious drawback of our samples is that Board adjudica-
tions constitute only a small percentage of all ULP "cases" filed
with the Board.6 Generally (as in the years we examined), most
cases are withdrawn by the charging party, dismissed for lack of
merit by the Regional Director (acting for the General Counsel), or
6 See 111-14 NLRB (1955); 247-53 NLRB (1980-81).
6 According to the NLRB's terminology, "a 'case' is the general term used in referring
to a charge or petition filed with the Board." See 45 NLRB Annual Report 232 (1980); 20
NLRB Annual Report 159 (1955). The Board adjudicated 9.6 percent of the 4,459 employer
unfair labor practice cases closed in 1955, compared with 4.4 percent of 29,411 of such cases
closed in 1980. See 20 NLRB Annual Report 166-67, Table 8 (1955); 45 NLRB Annual
Report 259, Table 8 (1980).
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settled by the parties.7 Consequently, our samples may not be rep-
resentative of ULP cases in the Board's total docket. Indeed, our
samples may well overrepresent the kinds of cases highlighted by
proponents of the rogue employer thesis. Those proponents postu-
late that employers bent on averting or subverting effective organi-
zation employ a strategy of coercion or delay in which they dis-
criminatorily discharge employees during organizational campaigns
and refuse to honor NLRB certifications or to engage in good faith
negotiations with a newly certified union. Employers charged with
such violations would presumably tend to be more resistant to set-
tlement and more inclined to exploit the dilatory potential in the
statutory procedures.
There are also difficulties associated with our small random
sample of 53 cases from the Chicago Regional Office that were set-
tled in 1985 or 1986. We examined those cases in order to get a
sense of the probable context of charges disposed of without adju-
dications.8 Unfortunately, the information concerning those cases
is incomplete and does not reflect a single consistent classification
scheme." The resulting difficulties were compounded by the sam-
ple's geographical limitations and its covering of 1985 and 1986
cases instead of the years reflected in our sample of Board adjudi-
cations. Because of those deficiencies, our analysis of settled cases
is, at best, only suggestive of their general context.
III. UNIONS' SUCCESS IN SECURING FIRST CONTRACTS
We found five studies estimating union success rates in trans-
lating NLRB certification into a first contract. Those studies have
" In fiscal year 1955, 49.2 percent of the employer ULP cases closed were withdrawn by
the charging party before a complaint issued; 26.4 percent were dismissed by a Regional
Director prior to issuing a complaint; and 11.4 percent were settled by the parties after a
complaint issued but before an ALJ hearing. In fiscal year 1980, 30.4 percent of the em-
ployer ULP cases closed were withdrawn by the charging party before a complaint issued,
33.2 percent were dismissed by the Regional Director prior to issuing a complaint, and 29.1
percent were settled by the parties after a complaint issued but before an ALJ hearing. See
20 NLRB Annual Report 166-67, Table 8 (1955); 45 NLRB Annual Report 256-57, Table 7
(1980).
' We obtained copies of these files through a Freedom of Information Act request and
the courteous cooperation of the Board's Chicago Regional Office. Naturally, we would have
preferred to have samples of settled cases from 1955 and 1980, but these files were not
available at that office.
' To determine the context and types of charges involved in cases settled, we relied on
several documents that typically appeared in the Regional Office's case files. Those docu-
ments varied from case to case, but among them were charges against employers, the closed
case forms, the complaint and notice of a hearing, the petition for a representation election,
and the tally of the ballots. From this information we inferred the types of charges and the
context of the cases in our sample.
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been the basis for contentions that that rate declined in recent
years. Although the estimates cover different years, they are based
on samples of certifications drawn from substantially different
populations. For example, the estimate for the late 1950s and early
1960s is based on a survey of certifications in only six of thirty
NLRB Regional Offices. 10 By contrast, the estimate for 1970 is
based on a survey of all AFL-CIO, UAW, and ILWU affiliates. 1
That survey excludes certifications involving the Teamsters and
other nonaffiliated units, but it includes UAW certifications even
though the UAW, like the Teamsters, was then not affiliated with
the AFL-CIO. Finally, estimates covering the late 1970s and early
1980s are based on samples that usually are small and are not rep-
resentative of the population of NLRB certifications. 12 Because of
those considerations, it is difficult to draw from comparisons
among such estimates reliable data on union success rates over
time. The findings of those studies and the samples on which they
were based are described below.
(1) Ross reported union success rates for 1957-1962.1s In a
sample drawn from only six14 of thirty NLRB regional offices, he
found that 86 percent of the certifications had been followed by a
contract with the certified union. In a second and different sample
of 575 certifications connected with a "finding or inference" of a
§ 8(a)(5) violation, he found that 51 percent of the newly certified
unions had secured a first contract. Furthermore, he found that in
those situations in the second sample in which the union had se-
cured a contract, 30 percent of the bargaining relationships had
ended by 1962.
(2) Prosten reported union success rates for 1970.15 Using a
sample of 2,656 certifications of AFL-CIO, UAW, and ILWU affili-
ates, he found that 77.65 percent of the newly certified unions had
secured a first contract. He also found that even when unions had
done so, 17 percent of the bargaining relationships had ended by
1975. The Teamsters and other non-affiliated unions were excluded
10 See Ross, The Labor Law in Action at 1, 12, 112-13 and 119 (cited in main text at
note 30). Ross's study had been prompted by suggestions that the enforcement of the duty
to bargain under § 8(a)(5) was ineffective. See id at 4-8.
11 Richard Prosten, The Longest Season: Union Organizing in the Last Decade, a/k/a,
How Come One Team Has to Play with Its Shoelaces Tied Together?, Industrial Relations
Research Assoc Ser Proc of the 31st Annual Meeting, 240, 246-47 (1978).
See Weiler, 98 Harv L Rev at 354 n 5 (cited in main text at note 10).
13 See appendix at note 10.
14 Ross does not further identify the six NLRB regional offices he examined.
15 See appendix at note 11.
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from his sample. But the UAW, although then non-affiliated, was
included. In any event, Prosten's sample covered only 62 percent
of 1970 certifications.16
(3) MacDonald reported union success rates for 1979-1981.1"
Using a sample of 271 certifications of AFL-CIO units with more
than 100 employees (or approximately 10 percent of AFL-CIO cer-
tifications),18 he found that unions had secured a first contract 63
percent of the time. Furthermore, even when unions had done so,
he found that 12 percent of such contracts had not been subse-
quently renewed.
(4) Cooke reported union success rates for 1979-1980.19 His
study was based on two samples of certifications. The first was a
nationwide random sample of 418 certifications of AFL-CIO affili-
ates. Like Prosten's sample described above, Cooke's first sample
excluded certifications involving the Teamsters and other unaffili-
ated units. Moreover, Cooke's estimates of union success rates were
based on only the 140 certifications concerning which he had re-
ceived responses to his survey of union representatives. His study
did not indicate whether that subset of certifications was represen-
tative of the entire random sample. For that subset, Cooke found
that certified unions had secured a first contract in 72 percent of
the cases. Cooke's second sample consisted of 118 certifications
from the NLRB's Regional Office in Indianapolis, which included
certifications involving the Teamsters and other non-affiliated
units. For that sample, Cooke found that 77 percent of the certifi-
cations had been followed by a first contract.
(5) Finally, Freeman and Kleiner reported union success rates
for 1979-1985 in the NLRB's Boston and Kansas City regional Of-
fice.20 Using a sample of representation elections in units with
more than twenty employees, they found that 67 percent of 79 cer-
tifications had been followed by a first contract.
Of all the estimates of union success rates in securing a first
contract, the two most nearly comparable are the 77.65 percent re-
ported by Prosten for 1970 and the 72 percent reported by Cooke
for 1979-1980. Those two figures were based on samples drawn
from similar but not clearly identical populations of certifications.
" Prosten, The Longest Season at 247 (cited in note 11).
17 See appendix at note 12.
18 See 45 NLRB Annual Report 286, Table 17 (1980).
"-See Cooke, Union Organizing and Public Policy at 73-76, 84-85 (cited in main text at
note 161).
1o Calculations by authors from sample provided by Morris Kleiner. See main text at
notes 157-59 and accompanying text.
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These estimates suggest a slight but not dramatic decline from
1970 to 1980 in the success rates of AFL-CIO affiliates in securing
first contracts during that ten-year period. But because of the
small size of Cooke's sample, that difference is not statistically sig-
nificant and could easily have arisen by chance.
TABLE A
THE INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS CONTEXT
OF NLRB ADJUDICATIONS
[Percentage of Cases in Each Context]
PANEL 1
The Context of All Adjudications
Context 1955 1980
Nonunion Concerted Activities 3% 6%
Employer-assisted Unions 4 0
Organizational Campaigns 35 35
Post-election/
Prior to First Agreement 16 22
Established Bargaining
Relationships 41 36
Number of Adjudications 202 202
PANEL 2
The Context of Adjudications of § 8(a)(3) Allegations
Context 1955 1980
Nonunion Concerted Activites 2% 3%
Employer-assisted Unions 4 0
Organizational Campaigns 42 61
Post-election/
Prior to First Agreement 6 5
Established Bargaining
Relationships 45 31
PANEL 3
The Context of Adjudications of § 8(a)(5) Allegations
Context 1955 1980
Nonunion Concerted Activities 0% 0%
Employer-assisted Unions 1 0
Organizational Campaigns 12 20
Post-election/
Prior to First Agreement 43 42
Established Bargaining
Relationships 43 37
Note: Authors' tabulations were based on random samples of 1955 and 1980 Board
adjudications.
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